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Abstract
This thesis explores two topics related to cattle producers: the adoption of afforestation on
pastureland and the use of pasture management practices. Chapter 1 uses a triple hurdle model to
analyze a decision process related to the adoption and acreage enrollment of afforestation in a
hypothetical program. The results suggest that producers interested in afforestation are more
likely to have a college degree, own woodland, attend extension workshops, and have previous
experience with afforestation. Producers who were offered a lower incentive enrolled more acres
in the hypothetical program. Producers who were offered a higher incentive enrolled fewer acres.
Chapter 2 analyzes the use of ten pasture management practices. These practices were
then categorized into three subgroups based on the type of practice: riparian health, soil fertility
management, and other types of practices. Adoption of these practices were compared with
univariate statistics and analyzed using a trivariate probit regression. The results of the trivariate
probit regression revealed that ownership of woodland, extension workshop attendance, and
average annual precipitation were significant predictors of adoption. As the results demonstrate,
extension workshops have a large positive effect on the conservation behavior of cattle
producers. Producers who are most interested and willing to adopt and use these practices are
those who are most likely to attend to attend extension workshops. Therefore, extension
workshops as a way to reach out to those who are interested could be a way to increase producer
participation.
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Introduction
This thesis contains two chapters related to the adoption and use of conservation practices by
cattle producers. The first chapter analyzes the adoption of afforestation on pastureland, given a
hypothetical incentive program. Chapter 2 examines the current use of ten pasture management
practices. Both chapters provide a unique opportunity to examine cattle owner behavior and
perceptions about afforestation of pastureland and pasture management practices.
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Chapter 1: A Study of Cattle Producer Willingness to
Afforest Pastureland

2

Abstract
The agricultural sector is under mounting political pressure to curb greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. The beef industry, in particular, is often singled out for its disproportionate GHG
emissions rate compared with other agricultural production. For example, on a pound for pound
basis, the production of beef emits ten times more GHG than the production of chicken. One way to
mitigate atmospheric carbon accumulation is to create sinks or environmental structures that
sequester GHG. On agricultural land, sinks can be created by maintaining quality pasture land or
planting trees. Research suggests that sequestration on agricultural lands has the potential to offset a
significant portion of the GHG emissions from agricultural production. Afforestation of pastureland
is a practice that could affect GHG emission from beef production.
This chapter analyzes the willingness of beef cattle producers in the eastern U.S. to afforest
pastureland. Using data from over 2,000 respondents to a mail survey that included a choice
experiment with a hypothetical incentive program, willingness to afforest pastureland is analyzed
using a triple hurdle model and a conditional mixed process model. The survey included questions
regarding producer characteristics and attitudes, and previous and present conservation behavior. The
triple hurdle in the model is comprised of results from questions focusing on general interest in
afforestation, willingness to afforest given a hypothetical incentive level (annual per acre payments
of $60, $90, $120, $150, or $180), and intensity of afforestation.
Percent of income from cattle production, education, previous afforestation and ownership of
woodlands are all significant variables in the first hurdle, which asks about general interest in
afforestation. In the second hurdle, which is based on willingness to afforest given a hypothetical
incentive level, incentive payment level and respondent’s age are significant. The regional variables,
latitude and longitude coordinates, are significant in the third hurdle, which is concerned with the
numbers of acres a respondent is willing to enroll in the hypothetical program. These results can be
3

used to better understand producer willingness to afforest and can help in establishing successful
afforestation programs in the future.

Problem Identification and Explanation
The accumulation of atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHG) is causing changes in the world’s
climate (USEPA 2013). Agriculture contributes between six and nine percent of all United States
GHG emissions (USEPA 2013; Lewandrowski et al. 2004). The majority of GHG emissions from
agriculture are nitrous oxide (N O and methane (CH . Beef production is responsible for a

disproportionate share of emissions (USEPA 2013). For example, on a pound-for-pound basis, the
production of beef emits ten times more GHG than the production of poultry (Jones, Kammen, and
McGrath 2008).
The concentration of atmospheric GHG can be reduced in one of two general ways: decreasing
GHG emissions or sequestering GHG into sinks such as oceans, soils, or forests. For example, in
beef production, net GHG reduction could be achieved by either decreasing cattle production,
thereby reducing methane emissions, or by increasing the carbon storage capacity of pasture land.
One way to increase the sequestration of carbon on agriculture lands is to reallocate agricultural land
to grassland, scrub, or forests (USEPA 2013; Gasson and Potter 1988; Paustian et al. 2006).
For all these reasons, there is currently an increased focus on agricultural and forestry offsets
designed to reduce GHG emissions from agricultural production and increase the sequestration of
carbon by agricultural lands. For example, the American Clean Energy and Security Act, which
passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009 but not the Senate, aimed to reduce U.S. GHG
emissions 17 percent by 2020, by among other things, increasing the amount of total forested acres
(U.S. Congress 2009).1 The American Power Act, introduced by Senators John Kerry and Joe

1

Other reduction strategies included renewable requirements for utilities, studies and incentives regarding new
carbon capture and sequestration technologies, energy efficiency incentives for homes and buildings, and grants for
green jobs.
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Lieberman, aimed to reduce GHG emissions 83 percent by 2050 through a regulatory cap and trade
program. The act emphasized the need for carbon offset programs, specifically on grazing and forest
land, to create incentive programs through the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to
encourage participation and support (U.S. Congress 2009).
Research suggests that sequestration can offset a significant portion of the GHG emissions from
agricultural production (Paustian et al. 2006; Woodberry, Smith, and Heath 2007). Agricultural soils
sequester 12 million metric tons of carbon per year (Paustian et al. 2006), but the amount could be
much greater with changes in prevailing land use practices. Removing land from intensive
agricultural production through land use diversion can increase carbon storage capacity and reclaim
lost habitat and productivity (Gasson and Potter 1988). The adoption of best management practices
(BMPs) such as no-till, erosion control, and riparian buffers can increase carbon storage in soils and
improve land productivity (Kim, Gillespie and Paudel 2005). The effects of forest management
practices on carbon sequestration rates have been extensively researched (Canadell and Raupach
2008; Hoen and Solberg 1994; Jandl et al. 2007; Michetti and Rosa 2012). Afforestation has received
some attention in the U.S. (e.g. Niu and Duiker 2006; Stanturf, Schweitzer, and Gardiner 1998), but
more attention has been given to this practice in Europe, Africa, and Asia (e.g. Schirmer and Bull
2014; Marey-Pérez and Rodríguez-Vicente 2009; Saliu, Alao, and Oluwagbemi 2010; Ni Dhubháin
and Greene 2009; Xu 1995).
Although forests and agriculture are not traditionally seen as related enterprises, incorporating
forests into agricultural production may effectively mitigate the effects of climate change. Forests
generally sequester carbon at higher rates than other land uses.2 In the U.S., forests account for 90

Increasing the sequestration of GHG emissions by forests can also occur though reforestation,
avoided deforestation, and improved forest management (Bull and Thompson 2011). In the U.S,
avoided deforestation is not necessarily a concern, because most deforestation occurred prior to the
twentieth century, and total forest area has remained relatively stable ever since. Although number of
2
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percent of carbon sequestration, while covering about 30 percent of U.S. land area (Woodbury,
Smith, and Heath 2007). Afforestation, as defined by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate
Change (IPCC), is “the establishment of forest on land that has been without forest for a period of
time and was previously under a different land use” (Watson 2000). Research suggests that
afforestation can be a cost-effective GHG mitigation strategy (Moulton and Richards 1990; Parks and
Hardie 1995). Although the rate of sequestration fluctuates depending on climate, ground
management, soil, and tree species (USEPA 2013; Niu and Duiker 2006), afforestation has the
potential to sequester relatively large amounts of carbon (Graham, Wright, and Turhollow 1992; Xu
1995).
Lewandrowski et al. (2004) found that afforestation on grazing land could sequester more
carbon than other practices such as reduced pasture fertilizer use, rangeland management, and
pastureland management. Birdsey (1996) predicted that afforested pasture could sequester between
0.73 and 2.09 Mt/acre, while Follett, Kimble and Lal (2001) estimated grazing management practices
could sequester 0.30 to 1.30 Mt/acre (Lewandrowski et al. 2004). Feng et al. (2006) looked at
incentive payments offered to farmers for enrolling land into either land retirement programs or
changing practices on working land. Their results suggest that converting land to forests is more costeffective in reducing atmospheric GHG than adopting conservation practices on working farmland.
Despite potential benefits, afforestation has some potential drawbacks. According to Ciscell
(2010), carbon offset programs, such as afforestation projects, have the potential to be ineffectual,
have adverse environmental effects, and distract attention from the need to decrease emissions.
Nonetheless, afforestation projects are likely to remain part of the climate mitigation portfolio
(Schirmer and Bull 2014).

forested acres decreased from the years 1949 to 1997, between the years 2002 and 2007, the amount
of forestland in the United States increased three percent (USDA 2011).
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Afforestation could be accomplished either through regulation or voluntary incentive
programs (Ribaudo, Hansen, and Hellerstein 2011). For example, the Chicago Climate Exchange
(CCX) is a voluntary trading program that incentivizes carbon sequestration. While afforestation can
be economical, especially on marginal land (Moulton and Richards 1990), incentivizing afforestation
projects remains challenging (Parks and Hardie 1995). Given the difficulties of measuring carbon
sequestration from afforestation across diverse geographical landscapes, some researchers conclude
that market-based trading may not be practical (e.g. Antle et al. 2000). Thus, policies are likely to
rely on per acre payments for specified land use changes or land use management, such as the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), a buy-out program created by the USDA that is structurally
similar to a potential carbon sequestration program (Shoemaker 1989). The primary goal of the CRP
is to reduce soil erosion by taking marginal land out of production. Unlike BMP adoption,
afforestation usually eliminates other productive land uses. As a result, voluntary programs that aim
to increase forested acres typically provide start-up costs and reimbursements for the opportunity
costs associated with taking land out of agricultural production (McCarl and Callaway 1995).
This study seeks to enhance understanding of cattle producer attitudes toward afforestation
and participation in a voluntary incentive program to promote afforestation. In 2002, 782 million
acres of land (35 percent) of total U.S. land area was pastureland. Thus, there is ample opportunity
for widespread afforestation of pastureland. There is also precedent, as extensive amounts of grazing
land have been converted to wildlife, recreational, and environmental uses since the 1940s
(Lubowski et al. 2006). Further, through practices such as management intensive grazing (MIG), less
land can be devoted to pasture grazing without reducing cattle production (Gillespie, Kim, and
Paudel 2007). In addition, research finds that many land users underutilize their pasture acres,
resulting in inefficient use of forage and foregone revenues (Lyons and Machen 2001). Utilizing
pastureland efficiently means maintaining a balance between maximizing stocking densities while
not exceeding the land’s carrying capacity.
7

To design and implement a voluntary policy that is cost effective and reduces the GHG
emissions associated with cattle production, it is important to understand cattle producer attitudes
regarding carbon sequestration and afforestation. Knowledge of markets and payments is important
for determining the factors influencing afforestation adoption, but little is known about cattle
producer willingness to convert land to forest and how this willingness varies across producer and
farm characteristics and cost-share incentives. Afforestation is often targeted at small, private
landowners, so understanding characteristics of these producers is essential in understanding
adoption behavior (Schirmer and Bull 2014).

Research Objectives
The primary objective of this research is to estimate the willingness of cattle producers east
of the 100th meridian to convert pasture land to forest. This research also analyzes how producer
willingness to adopt afforestation varies across demographic and farm characteristics (e.g. income,
geographic location, age, etc). Cattle producer’s acreage response to cost share incentives for
conversion to forestland is estimated.

Literature Review
Afforestation can productively use marginal land, improve water quality, and provide
supplemental income to farmers through conservation program payments and timber sales (Howley
2013; Plantinga and Wu 2003; Plantinga, Alig, and Cheng 2001). When looking at potential
afforestation adoption rates among cattle producers, there are several strands of literature to consider.
In addition to the literature related to the adoption of afforestation, forest owner motivations and
conservation under land retirement programs can provide useful insights as well.
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Afforestation
There are several studies that examine the adoption of land use change, including
afforestation, for the purpose of carbon sequestration. Schirmer’s and Bull’s (2014) study examines
private landholder willingness to afforest for carbon sequestration in a hypothetical program in
Australia. Using survey data, several willingness to afforest factors were analyzed: social
acceptability of afforestation, landowner knowledge of afforestation, attributes of afforestation, and
land and landowner characteristics. The results indicated that 13.6 percent of respondents were
actively thinking about afforestation and that producers are open to afforestation as long as it does
not interfere with their current level of agricultural production. Generally, producers were more
willing to afforest if they enrolled small parcels of marginal land as compared with large ones.
Landholder beliefs also played a significant role in willingness to afforest; agrarian priorities were
important to respondents and the results suggest that afforestation is counterintuitive to a
“productivist ethic.” Schirmer and Bull argue that afforestation programs should be developed in a
way that will not challenge farmer attitudes or detract from food production.
In a study of Canadian farmers, Shaikh, Sun, and van Kooten (2007) analyzed the probability
of landowner participation and willingness to accept (WTA) payments for a program promoting
afforestation. The results suggested that farmers are unwilling to convert agricultural land to forest
without financial incentives. However, farmers were willing to convert land into forests for payments
for less than the returns from agricultural production. The authors proposed that non-timber forest
amenities, such as shade, improved water quality, and wildlife habitat, may explain why producers
are willing to accept a lower return. The results also found that WTA is positively correlated with
producer age and negatively correlated with income. The level of education was found to positively
influence adoption rates. The authors also asserted that foregone returns from agricultural production
do not measure the willingness to convert land to forest because: 1) there are geographic and climate
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variations, 2) financial returns from trees are long-term, causing a disruption in liquidity, and 3)
farmers have differing opinions toward forests and agricultural land. The authors recommended that
landowners be compensated based on their WTA instead of estimated net returns, as some farmers
receive benefits from the positive externalities associated with planting trees. Plantinga (2003) points
out that these benefits are not typically taken into consideration in abatement cost estimates.
However, as Tassone, Wesseler, and Nesci (2003) found, afforestation is unprofitable for farmers
unless governments can provide subsidies, as in the case of afforestation programs in the European
Union.
Several studies examined forest owner participation in conservation programs through
surveys of forest owners. Dickinson et al. (2012) estimates the probability of forest owners
participating in carbon offset programs. They find that forest owners are less likely to participate if
there is a large time commitment or the program requires an intricate management plan. Similarly,
Kilgore et al. (2008) find several factors influenced participation in a carbon sequestration program:
awareness of the program, compensation amount, total acres owned, and “opposition to the
program’s land covenant.” Even so, they find that participation rates can be increased by raising
awareness and increasing payments. Langpap (2004) argue that participation in forestry programs
can be increased by targeting younger producers interested in conservation and creating wildlife
habitat.
Studies examining landowner motivation for converting land to forest may also provide
insights into the characteristics that are likely to influence producer willingness to afforest
pastureland. A number of these studies have focused on Irish landowners (i.e., Frawley and Leavy
2001; Kearney 2011; Ní Dhubháin and Gardiner 1994; Ní Dhubháin and Greene 2009; Howley
2013). In a review of the literature related to farmer attitudes toward forestry, Kearney (2001) found
that the most important factor affecting afforestation over time is its profitability as a land use option.
The author concludes that cattle production is in direct competition with acres that could be forested.
10

Frawley and Leavy (2001) find a similar result from a survey analyzing the factors that influenced
farmers to convert some portion of their land to forest. More than half of the respondents perceived
forestry favorably. Reasons given for not afforesting included “farm too small” and “prefers to
farm.” Nonetheless, for those respondents who had afforested, maximizing land value was cited as
the main reason, and 90 percent of farmers who had converted land to forest indicated they were
happy with their experience. The authors suggest that lack of tradition and knowledge of forestry
practices may explain why afforestation is a low preference land use option for producers. Ní
Dhubháin and Gardiner (1994) studied farmer attitudes toward forestry and factors that influence the
decision to afforest by surveying people who previously planted trees. The most-frequently cited
reason for afforestation was to provide shelter for cattle followed by financial reasons. Eighty-four
percent of respondents maintained that neither their farm output nor workloads were affected by
afforesting. Lack of suitable land and limited land resources were the most common reasons why
people did not afforest. Ní Dhubháin and Greene (2009) found that landowners afforested to “use up
marginal land” and because of financial opportunities. “Ecological value,” “cover for game and
wildlife,” and “to produce timber for sale” were among some of the other reasons to convert land to
forest. Howley (2013) looked at factors that influence forest owner forest management. His results
showed that sorting forest owners into groups based on their ownership objectives (i.e. lifestyle,
economic, and multifunctional) allowed for policy makers to effectively influence forestry adoption.
Collectively, these Irish studies suggest that while the decision to afforest agricultural lands is
primarily motivated by financial concerns, farmers do view forested lands differently than they view
agricultural land.
Other studies explain willingness to afforest. Zubair and Garforth (2006) found that farmer
willingness to plant trees is related to their attitudes toward forestry. In this Pakistani study, farmers
who planted trees believed that the financial and economic benefits were greater than the “adverse
effects.” The influence of peer pressure, such as the opinions of family members, friends, and
11

politicians, was also found to influence tree planting. Results show that farmers planted trees to
increase income, provide firewood, provide ecological benefits, and because costs were low. Saliu,
Alao, and Oluwagbemi (2010) evaluated participation in a Nigerian afforestation program. The
authors determined that afforestation was conditional on the farmer income level. In one European
study, the authors investigated how different types of producers (i.e., hobby, part-time, full-time, or
retired) managed land, mainly focusing on afforestation (Praestholm, Reenberg, and Kristensen
2006). Analyzing survey results, they found that hobby and part-time farmers have a higher
willingness to afforest than retired and full timers. Tom (2010) found that several factors negatively
influenced afforestation rates in Kenya, including poor land use practices, lack of capital, insufficient
land holdings, insecure land tenure, competing land uses, and labor shortages. Competing use of land
was the predominant reason why land owners did not afforest.

Participation in land retirement programs
A number of studies have examined land diversion, land retirement, and changing land use
practices. For example, Gasson and Potter (1988) studied British farmers’ responsiveness to
hypothetical programs that would compensate farmers for diverting working agricultural lands to
untilled land, forests, or permanent pasture. The study found that payments for land diversion could
achieve economic and environmental objectives, but that voluntary programs would have little effect
on farms with no previous experience with conservation practices. The authors estimate that three
percent of available farmland would be converted to forest under a hypothetical cost-share program.
One study finding is that those farmers who already had forest on their property offered more land to
forests than those who did not.
Using enrollment data from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Plantinga, Alig, and
Cheng (2001) estimated supply functions for grassland and forested land at different cost-share
prices. Their results suggest that farmers in the East had a steep supply curve, i.e., a higher payment
12

was required to encourage land enrollment into forests. The Southeast was more amenable to
converting agricultural land to forest. In the North and South Plains, grassland enrollment was the
most popular choice, because the regional climates are not ideal for forestry. Thus, to promote
afforestation in these regions, additional incentives would be required. Lambert, Sullivan, and
Claassen (2007) also analyzed participation in the CRP and choice of management practices
implemented using data from the USDA’s 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Survey
(ARMS). The results show that farmers who earned a larger percentage of their income from
farming enrolled more land than those who earned less of their income from farming. The study finds
few demographic differences between CRP participants and non-participants. The authors find that
land retirement is more appealing to retired or recreational farmers, for whom land diversion schemes
can provide supplemental income. The results suggest that whole field retirement appeals to farmers
who have marginal land and pasture that cannot be used for crop production.

Survey Data
The survey used a random sample of beef cattle, cow/calf, and backgrounding/stockering
operations from the eight Economic Research Service (ERS) Regions east of the 100th meridian. The
ERS regions are based on commodity production, geographical specialization, and other
characteristics (USDA-ERS, 2007). The sample was drawn by USDA’s National Agricultural
Statistics Service (NASS) and was limited to operations with at least 20 head of cattle as reported by
the 2007 Census of Agriculture to decrease the likelihood of sampling hobby farms. A copy of the
survey is attached as Appendix A. A total of 8,875 operations were randomly chosen from the
population of 267,413 farms. The survey sample represented three percent of the total population.
The sampling intensity and design was based on a three percent margin of error at a 95 percent
confidence interval. Post stratification weights were developed based on the cross tabulation of farm
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sales classes and ERS regions (Lambert et al. 2014a). USDA/NASS sent out the survey in early 2013
with an initial mailing, a reminder postcard (one week later), and second follow up mailing (two
weeks later). A total of 2,448 completed surveys were returned for a 28 percent response rate.
The survey was divided into three sections. The first section (“Your Farming Operation”)
focused on the characteristics of the producer and the operation. The next section (“Afforestation”)
informed respondents about what afforestation is and how it might benefit both them and the
environment. Respondents were then asked about a hypothetical program including an incentive paid
over a 10 year period as well as a 75 percent purchase and installation cost share to either afforest
acres, or, for those who had already afforested pursuant to a government program, to expand the
number of acres afforested. Five versions of the survey were administered. Each version was the
same in all respects, except for the hypothetical incentive level offered. The annual incentive levels
were $60, $90, $120, $150, and $180 per acre. The price points were based on a presurvey of 300
producers. The survey versions were randomly distributed across the sample. If respondents had
afforested land through a government program such as CRP or EQIP, they were asked about acres
they had enrolled in the program and payment per acre received. Respondents were also asked their
opinions about factors influencing their participation and the outcomes they anticipated from
afforested land. The final section of the survey (“About You”) included questions designed to obtain
information on respondent demographics and factors that might influence willingness to afforest.
The survey collected information on respondent willingness to participate in a hypothetical
incentive program for afforesting land via a series of three questions. The first question asked about
respondent interest in afforestation and provided respondents with three response options: not
interested in afforestation, interested in afforestation if it were profitable, and interested even if it was
not profitable to afforest. Respondents who indicated they were either interested if profitable or
interested even if not profitable were asked whether they would afforest, given the hypothetical per
acre incentive payment. Respondents who accepted the hypothetical incentive and indicated
14

willingness to covert acreage on their farm to forest were asked how many acres they would be
willing to enroll in the hypothetical afforestation program. A tiered modeled approach is adopted to
accommodate this survey design, with levels of analysis: (1) willingness to afforest; (2) willingness
to participate in the hypothetical incentive program, given willingness to afforest and the incentive
level offered; and (3) participation intensity, or the number of acres the respondent would be willing
to enroll in the program, given acceptance of the incentive and participation in the program.
Producers are assumed to have two options for each acre of pasture: continue as pasture or afforest. It
is expected that if producer prefers to convert their land to some other use, say, plant corn, he or she
would have already done so.

Conceptual model
Interest in afforestation
The conceptual model follows Jensen et al. (2015). Afforestation is hypothesized to occur
when the producer’s utility (u) from afforesting is greater or equal to the producer’s utility from not
afforesting. A producer afforests when  1, ;    0, ; , where 1 denotes adoption of

afforestation and 0 is no adoption of afforestation; I is income; and x is a vector of operator
characteristics and farm structure attributes affecting the decision of whether to afforest or not.
McFadden (1974) provides the random utility model, which provides the framework for
modeling the adoption of afforestation. The utility from afforesting ( ) is defined as      


 where the state of afforestation is represented by j = 0,1. The coefficient of the farm structure or


producer characteristics vector (x) is , and  is an unobservable, independent and identically


distributed error term. In practice, the producer’s utility function is unknown because some

components are unobserved. The incomplete function of utility can be noted by   , where j represents

the state of afforestation. As described above, afforestation is a discrete choice, and all that is
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observable is the discrete choice decision, not the underlying latent utilities. When the latent variable
is positive, or      , the producer is expected to adopt afforestation.

Using the random utility model, the probability that a producer will afforest is Pr   1 

Pr   

     Pr   

, where  are the parameters to be estimated (Cooper

1997). The probability of afforesting is Pr   1  !" (, where !" is a cumulative distribution

function of  (Cooper 1997). The probability that a producer will adopt afforestation is a function of

his or her demographic variables.

Willingness to afforest given a hypothetical incentive payment
The offer of an incentive for producers to afforest could be expected to alter the producers’
decision making. Offering a hypothetical incentive, changes the condition for afforestation to

 1,  #; ,     0, ; ,   where 1 denotes participation and 0 is non-participation; P is a net
program incentive; and I and x are as before (Jensen et al. 2015). P is a net program incentive,
because the respondents are responsible for 25 percent of afforestation costs.
Because utility is subjective, each respondent’s utility function is comprised of different

components: u ,  #; ,  . Given these assumptions, producer willingness to participate in the

program, given the net incentive P, is  1,  #; ,        0, ; ,      (Jensen et al.

2015).
% ·

As Jensen et al. (2015) show, producers adopt afforestation, when %  % ·   

% 

 #    where % is strictly positive. The probability a producer participates in the program,

or accepts B, is extended to Pr '(()*+

,  Pr    

      Pr     

%  % ·

, . Other covariates (x) related to respondent’s finances may influence program participation given

an incentive level. Given incentive payment P, the probability of participating is Pr '(()*+

!" (%  % · #   · %, where !" is a cumulative distribution function of the error term .

, 
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Participation intensity
Producers willing to accept the incentive to participate in the program are also asked to
indicate the extent to which they are willing to participate, or how many acres they would be willing
to enroll. An important determinant of the acres enrolled into the program is the amount of acreage
producers have to enroll in the program. It is assumed that any such scale effects influencing the
program acres supply function are fixed in the short term, i.e. that a respondent’s total acreage
directly affects the number of acres that could be enrolled into the program (Jensen et al. 2015).
Acres enrolled into the program are only observed among the set of producers expressing a
willingness to participate in the program, meaning the respondent answers yes to both the first and
second hurdles.

Forest-specific considerations
Unlike other BMPs, afforestation usually requires exclusive use of land.3 Similar to
agriculture production, afforestation has risks: the uncertainty of potential diseases, land value, and
timber values all have an effect on willingness to afforest. As a result, many farmers may be reluctant
to afforest even when returns from forestry are higher than those from agriculture (Wiemers and
Behan 2004). Conversely, some producers may derive utility from forest ownership and be willing to
afforest even when financial returns from afforestation do not exceed those from continued
agricultural production (Schatzki 2001). As previously stated, the producer is assumed to have two
options for each acre of pasture: continue as pasture or afforest.
Because the benefits and costs of afforestation are dynamic, a simple net revenue equation
becomes more complicated. Marginal benefits of conversion can include forest benefits and incentive
payments. Forgone agriculture products, changes in land value, and added risk are included in
marginal opportunity costs. It can be assumed that producers make land-use decisions in order to
3

However, there are several studies that analyze multiple land use policies, such as joint livestock and timber
production (e.g. Riiters, Brodie, and Hann 1982; Watson 2000)
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maximize net present value (Schatzki 2001). Absent an incentive program, an owner of pasture land
would strive to maximize economic returns to the land by maximizing the present value of net
benefits (PVNP) for pasture land (Parks 1993):
(1)

PVNP= max - .π 01 , *1 ; 2  31 !1  45 !1 , *1 ; 26) 781 9+ s.t. ;1  01  !1
:

where 2 describes producer characteristics that influence profitability (e.g. extension workshops,

farm size, income, etc), 01 is acres in pasture at time t, !1 is acres in forest at time t, 31 is the per-

acre cost of converting land to forestry, and input and output prices are represented by *1 . Equation 1
is subject to a land constraint. While it is possible for producers to buy or lease more land, land
availability is restricted.
In addition to the hypothetical incentive payments for converting land to forests, expected
future timber harvest profits are also considered by the producer. After the ten year contract is over,
the producer faces another land-use decision. He or she can renew the afforestation contract
(assuming one is available), convert land back to agriculture, or leave the land in forest (no contract).
It can be assumed that some producers consider afforestation to be a permanent or irreversible landuse change. According to Parks (1993) land irreversibility is determined by “1) the marginal
agricultural lands are insufficiently productive to ever justify payment for land-clearing costs after
being converted to forests, 2) post-conversion forest benefits permanently exceed agricultural
opportunity costs or 3) conversion to forests under a land policy is required to be permanent.”
Perhaps as a result of increased commodity prices, some producers may choose to return to
agriculture production on forested acres. Assuming that ten years is not enough time for optimal
harvest, participants may want to leave their land in trees to harvest in the future, or maybe they find
utility in the afforested acres. Schatzki (2003) suggests that producers will opt for land uses that have
greater flexibility and lower start-up costs. To promote conversion of grazing land to forests, these
potential barriers should be considered in the implementation of program policy.
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Parks (1993) observes that producers do not think statically; rather, they consider “capital
gains” when making decisions in the long term. Assuming prices are known and discount rates are
constant, a model of producer decision making, taking future land-use decisions into account, could
take into consideration the following formation of net present value:
PV=- 4 01 , *1 ; 2) 781  -
:

(2)



5

!) 781  35 !  <= > ) 781

Where, 4 is the discounted stream of profits from pasture. The annual per-acre incentive payments

are represented by

5

. 35 is the same as above. The variable <= > represents the value of the afforested

land, discounted, after the expiration of the contract, i.e., ten-years:
(3)

<= =Max ?
>

@p > q – D5 E!  - 4 01 , *1 ; 2) 781
:

- 45 !1 , *1 ; 2) 781
:

F

Equation three represents the maximum of two different possible values – the value of the
afforested land if the timber was harvested and the land was converted back to pasture or the value of
the land if left in timber production. Price (p) could be that of board feet and q as the quantity. The
per acre cost of harvesting is represented by D5 . Assuming land would be converted back to

agriculture after timber harvest, agriculture profits are also considered.

Empirical model and estimation
Acreage enrolled in the hypothetical afforestation program is modeled beginning with
willingness to afforest (interest), willingness to participate in the hypothetical program given the cost
share and annual payment offered (accept), and the number of acres the respondent is willing to
enroll in the program (logacres) given acceptance of the hypothetical offer. This triple hurdle model
is modeled using a conditional mixed process model (Roodman 2011). As adopted from Jensen et al.
(2015), a triple hurdle regression (equations 4-10) models the afforestation adoption decision
sequence in three decisions, where latent variables represent the producer’s choice in each hurdle.
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(4)

(5)

(6)

GH+)I)J+K>  LK  K

1 , GH+)I)J+K> N 0O
GH+)I)J+K  M
0, GH+)I)J+K> 0
'(()*+K>  %LK  K

1 , '(()*+K> N 0| GH+)I)J+K> N 0O
'(()*+K  M
0, '(()*+K> 0| GH+)I)J+K> N 0
QRS'(I)J  TLUK  )K

QRS'(I)J ,
QRS'(I)JK  M
 ,

'(()*+K> N 0O
'(()*+K> 0

In the first hurdle (equation 4), producers were asked if they would be interested in
afforesting. Respondents expressing interest (interest=1) moved then to the second hurdle (equation
5). In this hurdle, producers were offered an upfront cost share and per acre annual payment.
Producers either refused ('(()*+ = 0) or accepted the offer ('(()*+ = 1). If accept=1, producers
were asked to supply an acreage amount given their willingness to afforest and participate in the
incentive program (i.e., GH+)I)J+  1 and '(()*+ = 1).

The triple hurdle model listed above is recursive (equations 4-6), so it can be assumed that

the error terms are correlated and assumed to be multivariate normally distributed each with an
expected value of zero (Jensen et al. 2015):

(7)

K
1
0
? K F ~Z<[ \?0F , ] ^
)K
_^U
0

^
1
_^U

_^U
_^U `a.
_
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Based on these assumptions, the parameter vectors (β, γ, η) and the covariance matrix in (equation 7)
can be jointly estimated using full information maximum likelihood. Jensen et al. (2015) provide a
log likelihood function for the model:

(8)

ln ; 

∑Ke1f8fg1l ln@Φ LK E  ∑Ke1f8fg1h ln@Φ LK , %LK , ^ E 
iifj1k> l

∑ iifj1k> h ln@D QRS'(I)JK |LK , %LK , TLUK , ^ , ^U , ^U , _E.
Ke1f8fg1k> h

Marginal effects
Calculating the marginal effects for this triple hurdle model is not straightforward, and it is
important to note that independent variables included in superior tiers indirectly influence the
marginal effects of dependent variables in lower tiers even if those variables are not in the equation
(Jensen et al. 2015). Using the conditional and unconditional means formulations of acres enrolled
into the program, marginal effects can be derived. The unconditional expected mean acres enrolled
are calculated as (for example, Yen and Rosinski 2008);
(9)

m QRS'(I)JK   nTLUK 

op


q · Φ LK  _^U , %LK  _^U , ^ .

The conditional mean of acres enrolled into the program is calculated as:
(10)

m QRS'(I)JK |QRS'(I)JK N 0, '(()*+  1  nTLUK 

op


q·

rp stuk vowux ,ytpk vowpx ,wup 
rp stuk ,ytpk ,wup 

.

The marginal effects equations 9 and 10 are estimated using a finite difference approximation
algorithm suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) and applied by Jensen et al. (2015), where the
variable’s marginal effect is equal to the mean difference between the unconditional and conditional
means. For the binary decisions, willingness to afforest (interest) and willingness to participate
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(accept), the marginal effects are derived from the numerator and denominator of the bivariate
cumulative density ratio in the conditional mean expression.

Factor analysis
The survey included a question on the importance of a number of different factors on the
respondent’s decision to participate in the afforestation program (figure 1 in appendix B) and a
question on the likelihood of various effects of participation in the afforestation program on the
respondent’s operation (figure 2 in appendix B). Responses to these questions were included as
explanatory variables in the model through factor analysis.
Factor analysis simplifies the dimensionality of multiple variables, collapsing variable sets
into a few common factors using a loading score. Factor analysis is useful when working with several
variables that are expected to be positively correlated with one another, and is used to determine the
relationship between the questions and the latent traits that are displayed through respondent answers
(Thurstone 1931).
Answers to the questions included in the factor analysis are relevant to the motivations of a
respondent participating in the afforestation program. Using a factor analysis on the two questions
eliminates the possibility of having collinear variables. The factor analysis was performed using the
factor command in Stata.
Common factor analysis produces orthogonal factors by estimating a common variance
among the original variables. When determining factors, a common rule is any factor with an
eigenvalue exceeding one should be included in the analysis (Thurstone 1931). Prior to rotation,
factor loadings may not sort well, which is indicated when the large eigenvalue values for the first
factor for the importance and the likelihood question, 5.89 and 4.50, respectively (tables 1 and 2 in
appendix B). Factor loadings may be clearly differentiated after rotation (Comrey and Lee 2013).
After rotation, the eigenvalues for the importance question changed to 3.62 (first factor) and 2.53
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(second factor) for the importance question and 2.57 (first factor) and 2.24 (second factor) for the
likelihood question. No other factors for either question had eigenvalues greater than one. Rotation of
the factor loadings was performed using Stata’s rotate command (StataCorp 2013)
Factor loadings range from negative one to positive one, and represent the correlation
between the variable and factors. Based on Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics, any loading with a
score above 0.6 should be considered in an analysis (Kaiser 1974). Fabrigar et al. (1998) also argues
for a 0.6 minimum. Nonetheless, factor loading should be considered in terms common sense and not
solely defined by a cutoff level. As explained below, the factor analysis results produced factors
loadings which met the recommended 0.6 minimum and made intuitive sense.
The importance question asked respondents to rank each characteristic’s importance from
“not at all important” to “extremely important” on their decision to participate in the program. The
question listed ten items, and the factor analysis created two main factors, which are labeled as
“private costs” (privcosts) and “social benefits” (socialben) (table 1 in appendix B). “Private costs”
include time and labor requirements, investment cost of converting land to forest, amount of
paperwork required, limitations on end uses of timber harvested, and per acre program payment
offered for converting land to forest. “Social benefits” include those characteristics that do not
exclusively benefit the respondent: carbon offset potential, knowledge about afforestation practices,
and the impact of afforestation on the environment.
For the afforestation impacts question, respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood of
various impacts of program participation on their operation on a five point scale ranging from
“highly unlikely” to “highly likely.” Two common factors stood out. They are labeled
“environmental benefits” (environmental) and “production benefits” (production) (Table 2 in
appendix B). Reducing the amount of soil erosion, improving water quality, improving farm
appearance, and improving wildlife habitat are associated with the environmental factor. Belief that
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program participation was likely to increase farm profitability, free up land for other agricultural
uses, and improve forage production correlate with the production factor.

Hypothesized effects of explanatory variables
A list of explanatory variables and hypothesized effects are found in table 4 in appendix B.
Respondents were faced with three decisions in this survey. The first was whether the respondent
was interested in afforesting or expanding afforestation (interest). Respondents who were interested
were then asked if they would adopt or expand afforestation given a hypothetical incentive payment
(accept). Several non-monetary variables included in the first hurdle were excluded in the second
hurdle, because the accept decision is based on a payment level. Because the incentive payment
(incentive) is introduced in the second hurdle, it is logical that only variables directly affecting a
respondent’s financial circumstance are included. The introduction of the incentive payment reflects
a change in the context of the decision from a general set of factors of afforestation interest to factors
directly relating to the profitability of afforestation. While, the variables’ effects on these two
decisions are expected to be similar, the significance levels are expected to differ. For example, if
age is hypothesized to be negative in the interest level, there would be no reason to believe that age
would change signs in the accept decision.
The third choice question asked for the number of acres the respondent would be willing to
afforest in exchange for the incentive payment (logacres). The variables included in the interest and
accept decisions are mainly farm and operator characteristics. The decision of logacres is assumed to
be directly influenced by incentive level, respondent total farmed acres, and each county’s
geographic coordinates. Because the logacres decision is a function of interest and accept, including
all of the variables included in those hurdles in unnecessary. However, several variables are thought
to influence the amount of acres respondents are willing to afforest and, thus, are included in the
logacres regression: incentive, acrfarm, latitude and longitude. The county centroid coordinates
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(latitude, longitude) are included because they are purely exogenous and can be a proxy for climate,
vegetative cover, and rainfall.

Socio-demographic attributes
Duesburg et al (2014), Frawley and Leavy (2001), and Ni Dhubhain and Gardiner (1994)
find that respondents with larger farms are more willing to adopt afforestation. This finding makes
intuitive sense, because respondents with larger operations usually have more resources to adopt
technology and conservation practices. However, Basarir (2002) and Gillespie et al (2007) did not
find adoption rates of BMPs to be affected by farm size. For this study, operators of larger farms
(acrfarm) are expected to be more likely to express an interest in afforestation and acceptance of the
payment. It is expected that respondents who already own woodland (ownwood) will be more likely
to afforest. The presence of forests can be an indicator that an operator’s land quality, land slope, and
climate are suited for forests. In addition, if a respondent has previously afforested (prevafforest), it
is expected that he or she is more likely to afforest in the future. For example, Duesberg et al (2014)
found that farmers who had previously planted trees were 12 percent more likely to afforest in the
future.
Schirmer and Bull (2014) found that age was inversely related with willingness to afforest
and/or reforest. Duesburg et al (2014) found that those operators between the ages of 45-64 were
more likely to afforest compared with older respondents. In a literature review of BMP adoption,
Prokopy et al (2008) found that that age is negatively correlated with adoption rates. It is
hypothesized that age (age) will be negatively correlated with interest and accept.
Afforestation is a long term investment. If the respondent plans for his or her family to take
over the farm operations (famtkovr), the respondent may be more likely to afforest (Kim, Gillespie,
and Paudel 2008). This variable is hypothesized to positively influence interest and accept. Because
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afforestation is tied to the land, it makes sense that the future of the farm should be taken into
consideration.
In an analysis of Irish forest owners, Howley (2013) found that having an off-farm job had a
positive effect on a producer’s likelihood of planting trees. If a producer has an off farm job, he or
she might be more inclined to choose a land use with a limited time demand, such as forest.
Similarly, Duesburg et al (2014) found that full-time farmers were less likely to afforest. Thus, the
dummy variable identifying those who worked off the farm (offfarmwork) is expected to be
positively correlated with interest and accept.
Respondent total household income (income), on and off farm, is expected to positively
correlate with interest and accept. Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel (2008) found that cattle producers with
higher incomes were more likely to adopt BMPs. Similarly, Gillespie et al (2007) found the percent
of income from cattle and beef operations to be positively correlated with BMP adoption rates. Thus,
the percent of income from cattle and beef operations (cowpercent) is hypothesized to be positively
correlated with interest and accept. It is hypothesized that respondents who did not graduate from
college will be less likely to afforest than those who attended or graduated from college (socol and
college). Respondents with more education are probably more likely to be aware of possible
conservation and environmental efforts.
Lastly, the incentive level (incentive) is expected to have a positive influence on accept and
logacres. As the incentive level increases so does the return to afforestation. A significant and
positive coefficient on logacres indicates that those producers who are offered a higher incentive
payment are willing to enroll more acres in the afforestation program.

Regional characteristics
In addition to farm and producer characteristics, several variables representing characteristics
of the area in which the operator is located were included. The county centroid for each respondent
26

was represented latitude and longitude coordinates. Geographic coordinates are straightforward and
can be easier to interpret than regional variables, such as the Farm Resource Regions produced by
USDA’s Economic Research Service in which regions are delineated on the basis of production,
temperature, rainfall, etc. Latitude lines are the “y” coordinate on a map (latitude) with higher
latitudes in the north and lower in the south. Longitude lines are the “x” coordinate (longitude),
which begin at zero on the prime meridian in Europe and are positive to the east and negative to the
west. In the U.S., longitude decreases from east to west. It is hypothesized that both latitude (latitude)
and longitude (longitude) will be negatively correlated with willingness to afforest. As Plantinga,
Alig, and Cheng (2001) find, conservation costs are highest in Appalachia, the Delta States, the
Northeast, and the Southeast relative to other regions. The areas that are more “cost effective” are the
Northern Plains, Great Lake States, the Corn Belt, and the Southern Plains. Nonetheless, the change
in county population density from the 2000 to the 2010 census (changeindensity) is expected to be
negatively correlated with willingness to afforest. Increasing population density implies higher land
values and greater opportunity costs to afforestation. Increases in population density may be
associated with increases in development pressure and decreases in the likelihood that forest will be
the most profitable or desirable land cover. Producers in regions with increasing population density
might be reluctant to enroll in a ten year contract because of uncertainties about future land values. A
chart of the adoption decision process is shown in figure 3 in appendix B.

Results
There are several sets of results presented in this chapter. First, each hurdle of the adoption
process is estimated individually. The first two decisions, interest and accept, are modeled using
probit regressions. The third adoption decision, logacres, is a continuous variable. However, because
each adoption decision affects the subsequent decision, modeling each decision separately does not
account for the sample selection that occurs as respondents navigate the hurdles. Thus, these results
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are not of primary interest. However, the results of the single equations are provided in tables 5-7 of
appendix B for reference and comparison with the main results of the system of equations.
Of more interest are the results from the triple hurdle model. The triple hurdle model is
significant overall. The rejection of the null hypothesis, that beta is equal to zero, demonstrates that
the covariates are jointly significant in explaining the three afforestation decisions. The correlation

between the error terms (^ , ^U , ^U ) of each adoption decision are significant (table 8 of appendix
B).

Respondents answered questions regarding a hypothetical cost-share afforestation program.
The program promised to match 75 percent of the planting costs and provide an annual payment for
10 years. Of the respondents who answered the interest question (hurdle 1), 314 (29 percent) were
interested in afforestation. Out of those respondents, 179 indicated they would be willing to afforest.
These respondents who said yes to the second hurdle were willing to enroll an average of 73 acres in
the hypothetical afforestation program.

Interest in Afforestation
There are 19 variables included in the interest regression, eight of which are significant at the
10% level (table 8, appendix B). The percent of respondent’s farm income from cattle production
(cowpercent) has a positive effect on interest; the more cattle revenue a producer brings in compared
to his or her overall farm income, the more likely he or she is to be interested in afforestation. This
result might seem counterintuitive. One might expect that a greater percent of revenue from cattle
would be associated with a lower interest in planting trees on potentially profitable grazing land. In
addition, cowpercent could be a proxy for the prioritization of cattle on a respondent’s farm.
However, the positive coefficient could reflect a desire among producers to diversify their farming
operations. Compared with those who attended or graduated high school (i.e., highsch used a base
case in model), respondents who graduated from college (college) are more likely to be interested in
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afforesting. Thus, respondents who only attended high school are less likely to be interested. As
hypothesized, age was found to have a negative effect on interest. Older producers are less likely to
be interest in planting trees than younger ones.
The variables prevafforest and ownwood are also positively correlated with interest. Those
respondents who have previously afforested or are currently afforesting (prevafforest) or who own
woodland (ownwood) are more likely to be interested in afforestation. The prevafforest variable
reflects purposeful action by the respondent (i.e., planting trees), while the ownwood variable merely
reflects passive ownership. Nonetheless, both variables proxy what type of land a respondent owns
and both could reflect owner preferences for woodland.
Four factor variables were included in the interest hurdle (socialben, privcosts,
environmental, production). These variables were positive and significant. Socialben, environmental,
and production were expected to be positively associated with willingness to afforest, because they
involved questions regarding afforestation benefits. Although expected to be positive, privcosts
involved questions regarding possible land use drawbacks. If the respondent believes that time and
labor are a concern then he or she would be more willing to afforest. Relative to other agricultural
land uses, afforestation may be less time consuming. Thus, this significant positive relationship is
logical.
Finally, farm size (acrfarm), household income (income), off-farm employment
(offfarmwork) and the regional variables (latitude, longitude) were not significant in the interest
regression.
Willingness to afforest and hypothetical incentive payments
Out of the 314 respondents expressing interest in afforestation (and, thus, moving from the
first to the second hurdle), 179 replied they would adopt afforestation given a hypothetical incentive
payment. Figure 4 in appendix B shows the number of producers who were willing to afforest at each
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incentive level along with the cumulative total at each level. Surprisingly, as the incentive payment
gets larger, fewer producers are willing to commit to afforest.
The model of the adoption decision (accept) includes explanatory variables related to the
respondent’s monetary or fiscal characteristics. Three of the eight variables are significant at the 10%
level. Age is significant in this decision; it is positively associated with willingness to afforest. Age
switches sign in the second hurdle (relative to the first hurdle), once the incentive payment is offered,
which possibly indicates that among those producers who are interested in afforesting, older
producers are more influenced by monetary incentives than younger producers.
The incentive level (incentive) is positive and significant at the 10% level. The higher the
incentive payment, the more likely a respondent will accept the incentive and afforest. As
hypothesized, total acres farmed (acrfarm) is also positive and significant. The results indicate that
farmers with more land are more likely to enroll in the afforestation program. Unlike in the interest
decision, the percent of income from cattle production (cowpercent) and income (income) were not
found to be significantly different from zero.
Acreage conversion
The 179 respondents who said yes to both of the first two afforestation questions (interest,
accept) were then asked to state the number of acres they would be willing to afforest. The average
number of acres provided by the respondents is 73 (figure 5, appendix B). Interestingly enough, the
average number of acres respondents were willing to commit to the program decreased as the amount
of the incentive payment increased. Compared to respondents at the $180 incentive, the average
amount of acres offered at the $60 incentive was three times as much.
Of the four variables included in the supply of acres decision, two are significant at the 10%
level. Contrary to expectations, the coordinates (latitude, longitude) are negative and significant.
Regional characteristics have a large effect on adoption decisions. Respondents who are willing to
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participate in the afforestation program and who live in southern latitudes are willing to convert more
acres into forests than participants who live in more northern latitudes. As Plantinga, Alig, and
Cheng (2001) note, forestry is a “viable alternative” to farming in the Southeast, which is consistent
with our results. Similarly, respondents who live further west are more likely to convert land to
forests than eastern producers. Farm size (acrfarm) and the incentive level (incentive) are not
significant at the 10% level in this hurdle. Thus, the results suggest that the amount of the incentive
payment significantly influences a respondent’s willingness to afforest but not the intensity or extent
to which the respondent is willing to afforest (number of acres). This result suggests that people who
enroll acres in the afforestation program may be more influenced by the non-pecuniary benefits
forests can provide such as, wildlife habitat, water quality improvement, timber production, and
aesthetics.
The conditional mean number of pasture acres enrolled in the hypothetical program was
62.14, compared to the unconditional mean of 20.43. The conditional mean reflects acreage
conversion among those respondents who expressed interest in afforestation. The unconditional mean
is an estimation of afforestation acreage conversion among all 304 respondents.
As the incentive level (incentive) increases by one dollar, respondents enroll 0.18 less acres
(table 8, appendix B). Respondents who previously afforested (prevafforest) are willing to enroll
17.49 more acres than those who have not previously afforested in the program. Operators owning
woodland (ownwood) are willing to enroll 6.65 more acres than those who did not. Respondents with
a college degree (college) were willing to enroll 8.49 more acres than respondents who only attended
high school. For every one percent increase percent of income from cattle (cowincome), respondents
convert 0.007 less acres. For every one acre increase in total acres farmed (acrfarm), respondents
enroll 0.03 more acres. For every one degree increase in latitude, respondents enroll 7.01 fewer acres.
Similarly, for every one degree increase in longitude, respondents enroll 2.03 fewer acres.
Respondents enroll 0.62 more acres for every year older they are.
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Discussion
This analysis provides useful insights into cattle producer interest in and willingness to
afforest grazing lands. The results suggest a moderate level of interest in afforestation with 31
percent of respondents expressing interest in afforestation. Several factors significantly influence a
respondent’s interest, including having a college degree, owning woodland, having previously
afforested, being younger, and earning a greater percentage of farming income from cattle.
Respondents who expressed interest in afforestation were asked, hypothetically, if they
would afforest if given an incentive payment to do so. Of the respondents who expressed interested
in afforestation, 56 percent stated that they were willing to afforest given the incentive payment.
Willingness to afforest was positively influenced by the level of the incentive payment, and producer
age and total acres farmed. Not surprisingly, producers were more willing to afforest and accept the
hypothetical payment if the payment was larger. While older producers were less likely to be
interested in afforestation, they were more likely to be willing to accept the incentive and afforest, if
interested. These results may suggest that, when it comes to afforesting pasture, older producers are
more financially motivated than their younger counterparts.
Producers who were willing to afforest were asked to provide an acreage amount for
conversion. Acreage intensity was only affected by two geographic variables – latitude and
longitude. The number of acres a producer who was willing to afforest was greater in southern
latitudes than in northern latitudes. Similarly, producers who live in more western states are willing
to enroll more acres than those who live in the east. Respondents who are willing to afforest acres do
not appear to be particularly responsive to the incentive payment, as the incentive level had little
influence on the number of acres producers were willing to enroll in the hypothetical program. One
possible explanation is that the incentive payment and acres afforested is something similar to a
backward bending labor supply curve. In this example, it means that producers are making enough
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income, either on and/or off farm, to work less and consume more leisure. This idea is highlighted by
figure 5 in the appendix B. At the 60 dollar incentive payment, the average amount of acres provided
was almost three times greater than the 180 dollar incentive. Further research could be done on how
incentive payments affect acreage conversions in order to better understand this relationship.
One use for the results generated by this paper is to attempt to predict actual enrollment rates
and associated levels of carbon sequestration. What follows is a back-of-the-envelope stab at such
predictions, ignoring what are undoubtedly a large number of complications that should cause one to
take these predictions with a rather large grain of salt. That said, afforestation hypothetical
enrollment predictions and estimated carbon sequestration rates can be found in table 9 in appendix
B. The projected addition afforestation acres were estimated from the econometric model, based on
the conditional acreage enrollment. From across all ERS regions the total projected acres is 2.4
million, with the majority being in the Eastern Upland and Southern Seaboard. As stated previously,
afforestation has the potential to sequester large amounts of carbon (Lewandrowski et al 2004;
Birdsey 1996; Feng et al 2006). Using Birdsey’s (1996) estimates of 1.39 Mt/acre, projected carbon
sequestration rates under the hypothetical program were estimated (table 9). The potential total
amount of carbon sequestration was found to be 3.39 million Mt.
Future researchers could focus on why a respondent would want to afforest. For example, a
respondent could be interested in afforesting, because he or she is ready to retire from farming, while
another respondent could be interested in afforestation, because he or she has marginal land that is
not productive for grazing cattle. Similarly, agroforestry or joint cattle and woodland operation could
be of interest to respondents. Agroforestry can provide many benefits to a cattle operation such as
shade, wind protection, and erosion reduction. Further research should try to capture these
motivations, in order to better understand cattle producers’ views of forests, because knowing these
motivations would help policy makers design and implement effective programs to increase
conservation efforts while maintaining productivity.
33

References
Alig, R. 2010. Economic Modeling of Effects of Climate Change on the Forest Sector and Mitigation
Options. United States Department of Agriculture.
Antle, J.M., S.M. Capalbo, S. Mooney, E. Elliot, and K. Paustian.2000. Economics of Agricultural
Soil Carbon Sequestration in the Northern Plains. Trade Research Center, Montana State
University.
Basarir, A., 2002 Multidimensional Goals of Farmers in the Beef Cattle and Dairy Industries. PhD.
dissertation. University of Delaware.
Birdsey, R.A., 1996. Regional Estimates of Timber Volume and Forest Carbon for Fully Stocked
Timberland, Average Management After Final Clearcut Harvest. Forests and Global Change
2:309-334.
Bull, L., and D. Thompson. 2011. Developing Forest Sinks in Australia and the United States — A
Forest Owner's Prerogative. Forest Policy and Economics 13(5):311-317.
Cameron, A.C. and P.K. Trivedi. 2009. Microeconometrics Using STATA. College Station, TX.:
STATA Press.
Canadell, J.G., and M.R. Raupach. 2008. Managing Forests for Climate Change Mitigation. Science
320(5882):1456-1457.
Comrey, A. and H. Lee. 1992. A First Course in Factor Analysis: Psychology Press
Cooper, J. 2007. Combining Actual and Contingent Behavior Data to Model Farmer Adoption of
Water Quality Protection Practices. Journal of Agriculture and Resource Economics 22: 3043.
Dickinson, B.J., T.H. Stevens, M.M. Lindsay, and D.B. Kittredge. 2012. Estimated Participation in
US Carbon Sequestration Programs: A Study of NIPF Landowners in Massachusetts. Journal
of Forest Economics 18(1):36-46.
Duesberg, S., V. Upton, D. O'Connor, and Á.N. Dhubháin. 2014. Factors Influencing Irish Farmers'
Afforestation Intention. Forest Policy and Economics 39:13-20.
Fabrigar, L.R., D.T. Wegener, R.C. MacCallum, and E.J. Strahan. 1999. Evaluating the Use of
Exploratory Factor Analysis in Psychological Research. Psychological Methods
4(3):272.
Feng, H., L.A. Kurkalova, C.L. Kling, and P.W. Gassman. 2006. Environmental Conservation in
Agriculture: Land Retirement vs. Changing Practices on Working Land. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 52(2):600-614.
Follett, R., J. Kimble, and R. Lal. 2001 The Potential of US Grazing Lands to Sequester Soil Carbon.
Boca Raton, Florida: Lewis Publishers.
Frawley, J. and A. Leavy. 2001. Farm Forestry: Land Availability, Take-up Rates and Economics.
Rural Economy Research Series, The Rural Economy Research Centre, Teagas.

34

Gasson, R., and C. Potter. 1988. Conservation Through Land Diversion: A Survey of Farmer's
Attitudes. Journal of Agricultural Economics 39(3):340-351.
Gillespie, J., S. Kim, and K. Paudel. 2007. Why Don't Producers Adopt Best Management Practices?
An Analysis of the Beef Cattle Industry. Agricultural Economics 36(1):89-102.
Graham, R.L., L.L. Wright, and A.F. Turhollow. 1992. The Potential for Short-Rotation Woody
Crops to Reduce U.S. CO2 Emissions. Climatic Change 22(3):223-238.
Hoen, H.F., and B. Solberg. 1994. Potential and Economic Efficiency of Carbon Sequestration in
Forest Biomass Through Silvicultural Management. Forest Science 40(3):429-451.
Holt, Caroline Elizabeth. 2013. Producers Willingness to Adopt a Prescribed Grazing System East of
the 100th Meridian. Master’s Thesis, University of Tennessee
http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/2610
Howley, P. 2013. Examining Farm Forest Owners' Forest Management in Ireland: The Role of
Economic, Lifestyle and Multifunctional Ownership Objectives. Journal of Environmental
Management 123:105-112.
Jandl, R., M. Lindner, L. Vesterdal, B. Bauwens, R. Baritz, F. Hagedorn, D.W. Johnson, K.
Minkkinen, and K.A. Byrne. 2007. How Strongly Can Forest Management Influence Soil
Carbon Sequestration? Geoderma 137(3):253-268.
Jones, C., D. Kammen, and D. McGrath. 2008. Consumer-Oriented Life Cycle Assessment of Food,
Goods and Services. Unpublished. University of California, Berkeley.
Jöreskog, K.G., and A.S. Goldberger. 1975. Estimation of a Model with Multiple Indicators and
Multiple Causes of a Single Latent Variable. Journal of the American Statistical
Association 70(351a):631-639.
Kabii, T., and P. Horwitz. 2006. A Review of Landholder Motivations and Determinants for
Participation in Conservation Covenanting Programmes. Environmental Conservation
33(1):11-20.
Kaiser, H. F. 1974. An Index of Factor Simplicity. Psychometrika 39: 31-36.
Kearney, B. 2001. A Review Of Relevant Studies Concerning Farm Forestry Trends And Farmers’
Attitudes To Forestry. National Council for Forest Research and Development.
Kilgore, M.A., S.A. Snyder, J. Schertz, and S.J. Taff. 2008. What Does it Take to Get Family Forest
Owners to Enroll in a Forest Stewardship-Type Program? Forest Policy and Economics
10(7):507-514.
Kim, S., J.M. Gillespie, and K.P. Paudel. 2005. The Effect of Socioeconomic Factors on the
Adoption of Best Management Practices in Beef Cattle Production. Journal of Soil and Water
Conservation 60(3):111-120.
Knowler, D., and B. Bradshaw. 2007. Farmers' Adoption of Conservation Agriculture: A Review and
Synthesis of Recent Research. Food Policy 32(1):25-48.

35

Lambert, D.M., C.D. Clark, F.R. Walker, S.L. Larkin, J.A. Larson D.F. Mooney, R.K. Roberts, M.
Velandia, J.M. Reeves. 2014a. Adoption and Frequency of Precision Soil Testing in Cotton
Production. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 39(1):115-132
Lambert, D.M., P. Sullivan, and R. Claassen. 2007. Working Farm Participation and Acreage
Enrollment in the Conservation Reserve Program. Journal of Agricultural and Applied
Economics 39(1):151-169.
Langpap, C. 2004. Conservation Incentives Programs for Endangered Species: An Analysis of
Landowner Participation. Land Economics 80(3):375-388.
Lewandrowski, J., M. Peters, C. Jones, R. House, M. Sperow, M. Eve, and K. Paustian. 2004.
Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the US Agricultural Sector. US Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
Lubowski, R.N., A.J. Plantinga, and R.N. Stavins. 2006. Land-use Change and Carbon Sinks:
Econometric Estimation of the Carbon Sequestration Supply Function. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 51(2):135-152.
Lyons, R. and R. Machen. 2001. Stocking Rate: The Key Grazing Management Decision. Texas
Cooperative Extension. The Texas A&M University System.
Marey-Pérez, M.F., and V. Rodríguez-Vicente. 2009. Forest Transition in Northern Spain: Local
Responses on Large-Scale Programmes of field-afforestation. Land Use Policy
26(1):139-156.
McCarl, B.A., and J. Callaway. 1995 Carbon Sequestration Through Tree Planting on Agricultural
Lands. Library of Congress.
McFadden, D. 1974. Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior. In Frontiers in
Econometrics, ed. P. Zarembka, New York: Academic Press. pp. 105-42
Michetti, M., and R. Rosa. 2012. Afforestation and Timber Management Compliance Strategies in
Climate Policy. A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis. Ecological Economics
77:139-148
Moulton, R.J., K.R. Richards, and U.S.F. Service. 1990. Costs of Sequestering Carbon Through Tree
Planting and Forest Management in the United States: U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest
Service.
Ní Dhubháin, Á. and J. Gardiner. 1994. Farmers’ Attitudes to Forestry. Irish Forestry
51(1&2):21-26.
Ní Dhubháin, Á. and R. Greene. 2009. How Much do Irish Private Forest Owners Know about
Forestry? Small-Scale Forestry 8(3):249-262.
Niu, X., and S.W. Duiker. 2006. Carbon Sequestration Potential by Afforestation of Marginal
Agricultural Land in the Midwestern U.S. Forest Ecology and Management 223(1-3):415427.

36

Olenick, K.L., U.P. Kreuter, and J.R. Conner. 2005. Texas Landowner Perceptions Regarding
Ecosystem Services and Cost-Sharing Land Management Programs. Ecological
Economics 53(2):247-260.
Parks, P.J. 1995. Explaining "Irrational" Land Use: Risk Reversion and Marginal Agricultural Land.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 28(1):34-47.
Parks, P.J., and I.W. Hardie. 1995. Least-Cost Forest Carbon Reserves: Cost-Effective Subsidies to
Convert Marginal Agricultural Land to Forests. Land Economics 71(1):122-136.
Paustian, K., J.M. Antle, J. Sheehan, and E.A. Paul. 2006. Agriculture’s Role in Greenhouse Gas
Mitigation. Pew Center for Global Climate Change.
Plantinga, A.J., R. Alig, and H.T. Cheng. 2001. The Supply of Land for Conservation Uses: Evidence
from the Conservation Reserve Program. Resources, Conservation and Recycling
31(3):199-215.
Plantinga, A.J., and J. Wu. 2003. Co-benefits from Carbon Sequestration in Forests: Evaluating
Reductions in Agricultural Externalities from an Afforestation Policy in Wisconsin. Land
Economics 79(1):74-85.
Præstholm, S., A. Reenberg, and S. Kristensen. 2006. Afforestation of European landscapes: How Do
Different Farmer Types Respond to EU Agri-Environmental Schemes? GeoJournal 67(1):7184.
Prokopy, L., K. Floress, D. Klotthor-Weinkauf, and A. Baumgart-Getz. 2008. Determinants of
Agricultural Best Management Practice Adoption: Evidence from the literature. Journal
of Soil and Water Conservation 63(5):300-311.
Ribaudo, M., L. Hansen, C. Greene, and D. Hellerstein, U.S.Department of Agriculture. 2011. Use of
Markets to Increase Private Investment in Environmental Stewardship.
Richards, K.R., and C. Stokes. 2004. A Review of Forest Carbon Sequestration Cost Studies: A
Dozen Years of Research. Climatic Change 63(1-2):1-48.
Riitters, K., Brodie, J.D., and Hann D.W. 1982. Dynamic Programming for Optimization of Timber
Production and Grazing in Ponderosa Pine. Forest Science 28(3): 517-26
Roodman, D. 2011. Fitting Fully Observed Recursive Mixed-Process Models with Cmp. Stata
Journal 11: 159-206.
Saliu, O., J. Alao, and T. Oluwagbemi. 2010. An Evaluation of Farmers’ Participation in
Afforestation Programme in Kogi State, Nigeria. Journal of Agricultural Science 2(3):248257
Schatzki, T. 2003. Options, Uncertainty and Sunk costs: An Empirical Analysis of Land Use Change.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46(1):86-105.
Schirmer, J., and L. Bull. 2014. Assessing the Likelihood of Widespread Landholder Adoption of
Afforestation and Reforestation Projects. Global Environmental Change 24:306-320.
37

Shaikh, S.L., L. Sun, and G.C. Van Kooten. 2007. Are Agricultural Values a Reliable Guide in
Determining Landowners' Decisions to Create Forest Carbon Sinks? Canadian Journal of
Agricultural Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Agroeconomie 55(1):97-114.
Shoemaker, R. 1989. Agriculture Lane Values and Rents Under the Conservation Reserve Program.”
Land Economics 65(2): 131-137
Stanturf, J.A., C.J. Schweitzer, and E.S. Gardiner. 1998. Afforestation of Marginal Agricultural Land
in the Lower Mississippi River Alluvial Valley, USA. Silva Fennica 32:281-297.
StataCorp. 2013. Stata Statistical Software: Release 13. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.
StataCorp. 2013 Factor Analysis. Stata Statistical Software: Release 13. ColLege Station, TX:
StataCorp LP.
Tassone, V.C., J. Wesseler, and F.S. Nesci. 2004. Diverging Incentives For Afforestation From
Carbon Sequestration: An Economic Analysis of the EU Afforestation Program in the South
of Italy. Forest Policy and Economics 6(6):567-578.
Thurstone, L. 1931. Multiple Factor Analysis. Psychological Review 35(5): 406-427
Tom, E.G. 2010. Socio-economic and Cultural Aspects for Community Participation in Afforestation
and Agroforestry Programmes: A Case Study of Teso District, Kenya.
United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2013. Inventory of US Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990-2011. Washington D.C.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. 2009. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.
Washington D.C.: H.R. 2454m.
U.S. Department of Agriculture-Economic Research Service. 2014. Farm Resource Regions. Online
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/926929/aib-760_002.pdf. Retrieved August
2014.
U.S. Department of Agricultre-Economic Research Service. 2011. Major Uses of Land in the United
States, 2007. Online available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/eib-economic- information-bulletin/eib89.aspx.
Retrieved February 2015.
Watson, R.T. 2000. Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry: A Special Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Wiemers, E., and J. Behan. 2004. Farm Forestry Investment in Ireland Under Uncertainty. Economic
and Social Review 35(3):305-320.
Woodbury, P.B., J.E. Smith, and L.S. Heath. 2007. Carbon Sequestration in the US Forest Sector
from 1990 to 2010. Forest Ecology and Management 241(1):14-27.
Xu, D. 1995. The Potential for Reducing Atmospheric Carbon by Large-Scale Afforestation in China
and Related Cost/Benefit Analysis. Biomass and Bioenergy 8(5):337-344.
38

Yen, S. and J. Rosinski. 2008. “On the Marginal Effects of Variables in the Log-Transformed
Sample Selection Models.” Economics Letters 100(1): 4-8.
Zubair, M., and C. Garforth. 2006. Farm Level Tree Planting in Pakistan: The Role of Farmers’
Perceptions and Attitudes. Agroforestry Systems 66(3):217-229

39

Appendix A

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

Appendix B
Table 1: Factor Analysis of Importance of Items on Program Participation
Variables
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor Description
Socio-demographic/environmental questions
Amount of time required
0.2496
0.7886
Investment cost
0.3135
“Private Costs”
0.8442
Amount of paperwork
0.3272
(privcosts)
0.7647
Per acre payment offered
0.5007
0.6680
Limitations on end uses of timber
0.4739
0.6176
Offset carbon emissions
Level of knowledge about afforestation
Impact of afforestation on the environment

0.3040
0.5291
0.4092

0.7268
0.6021
0.7384

Availability of Extension services
Attitudes of friends

0.5325
0.2136

0.4949
0.3278

“Social Benefits”
(socialben)

Table 2: Factor Analysis of Likelihood Impacts from Program Participation
Variable
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor Description
Socio-demographic/environmental questions
Reduce soil erosion on farm
0.7987
Improve water qualitsy on farm
0.8039
Improve farm appearance
0.6055
Improve wildlife habitat
0.5941

0.3587
0.317
0.5035
0.2664

“Environmental
Benefits”
(environmental)

Free up land for other ag. uses
Improve forage

0.3368
0.3546

0.7462
0.7808

“ProductionBenefits”
(production)

Increase feed costs
Increase profitability

0.3057
0.4926

0.4482
0.5671
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Table 3: Variables and descriptive statistics included in the triple hurdle model
Name

Variable Description

Mean

N

Minimum

Maximum

0.30

1010

0

1

0.57

304

0

1

3.43

171

0

7.83

Annual per acre incentive payment
offered ($60, $90, $120, $150, $180)
Total acres farmed

121.97

304

60

180

491.39

1010

2

20999

Age of respondent

61.73

1010

24

95

income (a)

Total household income of respondent

4.01

1010

1

8

highsch
(omitted)
socol

0.36

1010

0

1

0.25

1010

0

1

1010

0

1

latitude

1 if respondent only attended or
graduated high school, 0 otherwise
1 if respondent attended college, 0
otherwise
1 if respondent graduated college, 0
otherwise
Latitude coordinate

36.90

1010

26.39

48.86

logitude

Longitude coordinate

-90.53

1010

-99.99

-68.09

0.08

1010

0

1

0.64

1010

0

27.83

0.66

1010

0

1

37.20%

1010

-10%

100%

DEPENDANT VARIABLES
interest

1 if respondent interested in
afforestation, 0 otherwise

1 if respondent would afforest given
incentive level offered, 0 otherwise
logacres
Acres would afforest given incentive
level
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
accept

incentive
acrfarm
age

college

prevafforest
stockdensity

famtkovr
cowpercent

1 if has previously afforested, 0
otherwise
Stocking Rate= (.92*cows+ .08* calves+
1.35*bulls+ .6*backgrounder calves+
.6*stocker calves+.92*dairy cows+
.8*replacement heifers
+.8*miscellaneous cattle)/ total number
of pasture acres farmed (Holt 2013)
1 if respondent’s family will take over
farm, 0 otherwise
Percent of farm income from cattle
1 if repondent works off farm, 0
otherwise
Factor analysis score

0.52

1010

0

1

0.07

1010

-2.01

1.78

socialben
environmental

Factor analysis score
Factor analysis score

0.02
0.07

1010
1010

-2.26
-1.56

2.16
2.30

production

Factor analysis score

-0.02

1010

-1.76

2.44

offfarmwork
privcosts

Changeinden- % change in county population density
181.17 1010
-99.63%
25293.6
sity
from the 2000 to the 2010 census
%
%
a Likert scale: 1 = less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000 - $29,000, 3 = $30,000 – $49,000, 4 = $50,000 - $99,000, 5
= $100,000 - $149,999, 6 = $150,000 - $199,999, 7 = $2,000 - $499,999, 8 = $500,000 or more
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Table 4: Variables included in the triple hurdle model, along with hypothesized
effects at each level
Name

Variable Description
Annual per acre incentive
payment offered ($60, $90,
$120, $150, $180)
Total acres farmed

Hypothesized Effects
Interest
Accept
logacres
+

+

+

+

+

Age of respondent

-

-

+

+

latitude

Total household income of
respondent
1 if respondent attended or
graduated high school, 0
otherwise
1 if respondent attended
college, 0 otherwise
1 if respondent graduated from
college, 0 otherwise
Latitude coordinate

-

-

-

logitude

Longitude coordinate

-

-

-

+

privcosts

1 if has previously afforested, 0
otherwise
*see footnote in table 3
1 if respondent’s family will
take over farm, 0 otherwise
Percent of farm income from
cattle
1 if farmer works off farm, 0
otherwise
Factor Analysis score

socialben

Factor Analysis score

+

environmental

Factor Analysis score

+

productionprof

Factor Analysis score

+

changeindensity

% change in county population
density from the 2000 and 2010
censuses

-

incentive

acrfarm
age
income
highsch

socol
college

prevafforest
stockdensity
famtkovr
cowpercent
offfarmwork

omitted
+
+

+
+
+

+

+

+

+
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Table 5: Results of Probit Regression of Respondent Interest in
Afforestation (first hurdle)
Std. Err.
z
Variable
Est Coef.
acrfarm(x100)
0.0030
0.0002
0.25
cowpercent
0.0040
0.0014
2.93
0.0044
-1.44
age
-0.0063
income
0.0321
0.0368
0.87
0.0616
5.81
socialben
0.3450
0.0642
6.04
privcosts
0.3881
environmental
0.2614
0.0583
4.43
0.0573
1.61
production
0.0903
latitude
-0.0158
0.0111
-0.59
0.0084
0.41
longitude
0.0034
changeindensity
0.0001
0.0000
1.73
0.3545
1.99
stockdensity
0.0305
0.1587
4.38
prevafforest
0.6957
ownwood
0.2941
0.1032
2.85
0.0996
1.36
famtkovr
0.1357
college
0.2884
0.1121
2.57
0.1224
1.66
socol
0.2034
0.1011
1.71
offfarmwork
0.1729
intercept
-0.301
0.9671
-0.31
N= 1010 LLR Test Wald χ (18)= 252.52*** McFadden's
R2=0.2044
Significant at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***)
Model fit: Wald Test reject H : β  0

***

***
***
***

**
***
***
***
*
*
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Table 6: Results of Probit Regression of Respondent Adoption Given a
Hypothetical Incentive Payment (second hurdle)
Variable
Est Coef.
Std. Err.
z
acrfarm (x100)
0.0200
0.0010
1.68
cowpercent
0.0010
0.0020
0.04
0.0017
1.77
incentive
0.0031
0.0066
0.65
age
0.0043
0.0177
-0.72
latitude
-0.0127
longitude
0.0226
0.0116
2.50
0.0562
-1.45
income
-0.0813
0.612
1.29
offfarmwork
0.2083
1.4089
1.96
intercept
2.7589
2

N= 314 LLR Test Wald | (8)= 14.94 McFadden’s R =0.0348
Significant at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***)
Model fit: Wald Test reject } :   0

*
*
**
**

Table 7: Results of OLS regression of Respondent Acreage Conversion (third
hurdle)
logacres

Est. Coef.

Std. Err.

t

0.0010

0.0010

2.30 **

incentive

-0.0015

0.0020

-0.71

latitude

-0.0949

0.0199

longitude

-0.0288

0.0127

-4.75 ***
-2.25 **

intercept

4.4711

1.4489

3.09 **

Acrfarm (x100)

N= 179 F test (4, 174)= 9.22***

McFadden’s R2=.1559

Significant at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***)

Model fit: Wald Test reject } :   0
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Table 8: Estimated Coefficients and Marginal Effects for Triple Hurdle
Regression
Estimates
Marginal Effects
logacres
accept
interest
logacres accept interest
incentive
-0.0001
0.0030**
--0.1804
0.0016
-acrfarm (x100)
0.0056
0.0030** 0.0020
0.0280
0.0001 0.0018
latitude
-0.0914*** -0.0081
-0.0089
-7.0060 -0.0256 -0.032
longitude
-0.0517**
0.0225
0.0037
-2.0318
0.0105
0.0012
income
--0.0589
0.0181
-3.8668 -0.0160 0.0065
age
-0.0105** -0.0090*
0.6213
0.0027 -0.0032
college
--0.3047*** 8.4989
-0.1093
socol
--0.1759
4.8796
-0.0622
offfarmwork
-0.1457
0.1029
7.7757
0.0387
0.0370
cowpercent
--0.0004
0.0031** -0.0056 -0.0012 0.1353
ownwood
--0.2388**
6.6570
-0.0858
famtkovr
--0.0599
1.5688
-0.0200
prevafforest
--0.6103*** 17.4507
-0.2166
socialben
--0.3016*** 1.4024
-0.1264
privcosts
--0.3441*** 2.3419
-0.1134
environmental
--0.3158*** 2.1366
-0.1134
production
--0.1259*
0.9681
-0.0412
stockdensity
--0.1219
0.3169
0.0043
changeindensity
--0.0001
0.0005
-0.0001
constant
2.9481
2.2249
-0.1537
N
179
314
1010
Percent Correctly Classified
54.18%
55.63%
Wald test against intercept only (4 df)
21.35***
Log pseudolikelihood
-104803.98
1.5952**
_
-0.8299**
^
0.4685*
^U
-0.8369**
^U
Significant at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***)
Model fit: Wald Test reject } :   0
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Table 9: Expanded Acreage Enrollment Estimates and Carbon Sequestered
ERS Region
Heartland

Estimated Acres
Enrolled (1000s)
344.53

Standard
Error
22.45

Metric tons carbon
Acre7 Year 7 1000s
485.78

Standard
Error
25.24

60.18

4.93

84.85

5.21

Northern Crescent
Northern Great
Plains
Prairie Gateway

75.63

11.93

106.64

11.97

827.65

197.57

1166.99

198.87

Eastern Upland

440.80

36.03

621.54

40.52

Southern Seaboard

419.06

32.86

590.87

33.68
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104.34

11.60

147.12

13.64

Mississippi portal

132.57

11.19

186.93

10.10

Total

2404.53

3390.72
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Figure 1: Importance Factor Analysis Question

Figure 2: Likelihood Factor Analysis Question
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Figure 3: The Adoption Decision Process
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Figure 4: Participation and Incentive Payments for Afforestation Adoption
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Figure 5: Participation Intensity at Each Incentive Payment
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Chapter 2: Modeling Use of Pasture Management Practices
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Abstract
The use of pasture management practices can provide many benefits for cattle producers
including increased forage and production capacity, reduced soil erosion, and better pasture and
water quality. Despite these benefits, many cattle producers do not implement pasture management
practices.
This study analyzed the results of a mail survey of over 4,000 cattle producers east of the
100th meridian to determine the factors that influence the usage of ten pasture management practices.
The ten pasture management practices were grouped into three classifications on the basis of factor
analysis results and multivariate probit model was used to analyze producer use of one or more
practice from each group. The dummy variable representing extension workshop attendance was
significant (p<0.10) and positive in every equation. Other positive significant variables were
woodland acres owned, income, and education. Age was found to have a negative effect in all cases.
Education through extension efforts is associated with the use of pasture management practices. If
policy makers want to increase the use of these practices, targeting producers who attend extension
workshops could be a solution.
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Introduction
The use of pasture management practices has many benefits including reduced soil erosion,
increased biodiversity and vegetative cover, and reduced degradation. Pasture management practices
can also reduce the cost of production and maintain soil fertility. For example, sediment is the largest
surface water pollutant in the United States (EPA 2014). Exposing bare soil to rainfall oftentimes
results in a large nutrient loss which can reduce future profits as the soil becomes less productive
over time. The use of pasture management practices can help alleviate sediment loss. These practices
are also important in helping manage imbalances of soil quality on pastureland. Practices such as soil
testing, fertilizer use, manure application, and replanting pasture can restore soil nutrients. In
addition, use of conservation practices can coincide with a successful and profitable farm by
lowering costs and increasing overall animal health (Lemus 2008).
Cattle producers have traditionally relied on ponds, streams, or rivers to water cattle.
However, providing cattle direct access to waterways can damage water banks, increase sediment
loading, increase invasive species growth, and spread water-borne diseases. Research has shown that
by providing an alternative water source, stream bank erosion and fecal bacteria entering streams can
be reduced. For example, Edwards et al. (2007) found that controlling stream access and using
nutrient management on pasture land significantly increased aquatic health. Despite the
implementation of government programs, as well as educational and extension efforts, the use of
pasture management practices, including best management practices (BMPs), varies from one
producer to the next. Many operators have not adopted pasture management practices, because they
struggle with prioritizing both farming and conservation adoption (Ellis 2014). Economic, political,
social, and geographic variables, such as site-specific environmental characteristics, lifestyle choices,
and attitudes on environmental stewardship, also contribute to why farmers use or do not use pasture
management practices (Gillespie, Kim, and Paudel 2007; Lambert et al. 2007). In order to design
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educational programming or policy to increase pasture management usage, an understanding of the
factors influencing use and patterns of use is beneficial.
The objectives of this chapter are to 1) analyze factors influencing the use of ten pasture
management practices that have proven farm benefits and 2) explore whether or to what extent there
are patterns in terms of the use of these practices (e.g. whether some more or less tend to be used
together).

Literature Review
Studying BMP adoption can be useful in understanding adoption of pasture management
practices. In addition, BMP adoption and the factors which influence adoption by farmers has been
extensively researched (Prokopy et al. 2008; Knowler and Bradshaw 2007; Kabii and Horwitz 2006;
Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy, and Floress 2012). For example, Prokopy et al. (2008) examine 55 BMP
adoption studies published from 1982 to 2007. The authors studied respondents who had previously
adopted BMPs. Studies of adoption by both livestock and crop farms were included in their literature
review. The study finds that education levels, farm size, access to information, positive
environmental attitudes, environmental awareness, and utilization of social networks are often
positively associated with adoption. The authors found conflicting information on how income and
age affect adoption rates. In addition, the authors found that the type of statistical analysis used in the
studies did not affect the results in most cases. Similarly, Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy, and Floress
(2012) analyzed the actual adoption of BMPs in 46 studies published between 1982 and 2007. Of the
findings relevant to this study, extension and environmental awareness were found to be positively
related to BMP adoption rates. The effect of age was found to be significant and negative on
adoption in many of the studies.
Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) reviewed past conservation agriculture (i.e., mostly soil
conserving) studies to identify factors that could explain adoption. Household income and farm size
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were among the variables that were positively correlated with adoption. Negatively correlated
variables included age and off-farm income. As the authors suggested, an increase in off-farm
income could lead to a decrease in prioritization of agriculture, which could result in a reduced
interest in soil conservation practices. Financial incentives influenced most producer decisions to use
conservation agriculture. Kabii and Horwit (2006) examined the factors that influence landowner
decision-making regarding conservation practices. The authors suggested that farmers are motivated
to adopt conservation practices if they have more financial flexibility, are more knowledgeable about
conservation, and farm as a way of life.
In addition to these literature reviews, some studies focused specifically on the factors that
influence cattle producer adoption of BMPs (e.g. Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel 2005; Gillespie, Kim,
and Paudel 2007). Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel (2005) analyzed the adoption of 16 BMPs by
Louisiana cattle producers. The authors found that beef cattle producer adoption was relatively low
compared with other agricultural operations, including dairy operators. Education levels were
positively correlated with adoption rates. The authors found that age was positively correlated with
adoption rates. They hypothesized that this was because many of the BMPs had been promoted for
years. Older producers were more familiar with the BMPs and likely had more time due to retirement
from off-farm jobs.
Gillespie, Kim, and Paudel (2007) also studied grazing management practices. Mortality,
nutrient and pesticide management were found to be the most frequently adopted BMPs among cattle
producers. The authors noted that these BMPs can have significant economic benefits for the
producer. Some common reasons for BMP non-adoption were non-applicability of particular BMPs
to the farm, unfamiliarity, unaffordability, or time required to implement. The authors emphasized
that extension and educational programs designed to promote BMP adoption should provide
information on the economic and environmental costs and benefits of BMP adoption.
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Survey Data
The data for this study came from two versions of a survey of cattle producers. The first
version focused on the adoption of prescribed grazing, and the second focused on the adoption of
afforestation. Both surveys used a random sample of beef cattle, cow/calf, and
backgrounding/stockering operations in the eight Economic Research Service (ERS) regions east of
the 100th meridian (figure 6 in appendix C). Thus, producers from the following states are included in
this study: AL, AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MA, MD, ME, MI, MN, MO, MS,
NC, ND, NE, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, VA, VT, WI, and WV. The ERS regions
are based on commodity production, geographical specialization, and other environmental
similarities. The sample was collected by USDA’s National Agriculture Statistics Service (NASS)
and had a 20 head of cattle minimum in order to eliminate hobby farmers. Every individual in the
sample was randomly assigned to one of the two survey versions. Each version had a sample size of
8,875 (for a total of 17,750) out of a total 267,413. Each sample represented roughly three percent of
the total available population (six percent total). The prescribed grazing version had a total of 2,551
completed surveys, for a 29 percent response rate, and the afforestation version had a total of 2,448
completed surveys for a response rate of 28 percent.
Each version of the survey had a similar structure. The survey was divided into three
sections. The first section (“Your Farming Operation”) included questions about farm size, rental
terms, and woodland acres owned. The second section (“Prescribed Grazing” or “Afforestation,”
depending on the version) included questions specific to each version. Respondents’ answers to these
sections are not included in this analysis as they are not relevant to this analysis. The third section
(“About You”) asked questions regarding producer characteristics, such as income, age, conservation
attitudes and hours worked per week.
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Included in the “Your Farming Operation” section was a set of questions regarding current
use of pasture management practices. Responses to these questions are the focus of this chapter.
Respondents were asked which of a specific list of pasture management practices they used. The
specific practices considered were: 1) Apply manure as fertilizer to pastures, 2) Apply N, P, or K
(DAP, urea, LAN, etc) to pasture, 3) Water cattle at site other than stream or pond, 4) Have buffer
strips of grassy vegetation along waterways, 5) Have shade structures, scratching posts, and feed
supplements placed away from the streams, 6) Have improved stream crossings, 7) Control livestock
access to streams, 8) Protect heavy use areas with geotextiles, 9) Replant bare pasture with legumes
or native grasses, and 10) Periodically test soil. Pasture management practices definitions, mean use
rates, total pasture acres managed, and a brief summary of possible benefits are found in table 10 in
appendix C. While most of these practices might be considered BMPs, several are not. For example,
while in some cases the application of fertilizer or manure is considered a BMP, the survey does not
specify an amount or use rate. Thus, to call these pasture management practices BMPs, might imply
more than is contained in the pasture management descriptions.
The pasture management practices were divided into three groups based on factor analysis
results: soil fertility and management (soilfertility), riparian health (riparianhealth), and other
practices (other). Practices related to soil fertility are npk, soiltest, and replantpasture. Riparian
health included the following practices: shade, bufferstrips, streamacces, and crossings. Other
practices are alternativewater, geotextiles, and manure. In addition, table 6 in appendix C shows the
pasture management practice categories.

Weights
To help compensate for producer non-response, post-stratification weights are used in the
trivariate probit model. The weights are based on each respondent’s ERS region (figure 6 in appendix
C) and household income. The weights allowed us to predict the number of farms that would be in
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the same income and regional groups according to the 2007 Agriculture Census. Farms categorized
in the corresponding ERS region and income group are weighted similarly (Lambert 2014a).

Statistical Analysis
Means and Associations
Univariate statistics are used to compare users of pasture management practices with nonusers. For the purposes of this study, “users” are identified as respondents who used at least one out
of the ten pasture management practices. Assuming unequal variances among the groups in this
study, t-tests are used to determine if two sets of data are significantly different from one another.
Specifically, the hypothesis tested is the following: does the mean number of pasture acres
significantly differ between users and non-users of pasture management practices? Unequal variances
are assumed because a more conservative estimate is produced by not assuming normality of the
underlying population (Ruxton 2006). The null hypothesis is rejected if the difference in each of the
variable means is significantly different from zero at the ten percent level.

Correlation Modeling
Correlation coefficients are used to analyze patterns of pasture management practice use
across respondents, i.e. which pairs of practices are more or less likely to be used together.
Spearman’s correlation is used to compare the variables. This is non-parametric and does not assume
linearity (Spearman 1904). It is hypothesized that use patterns exist among the pasture management
practices. It is expected that practices in the same group (soilfertility, riparianhealth, and other) will
exhibit higher correlations than practices across different groups. In addition, current federal
programs, such as Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), promote certain pasture
management practices that might be familiar to some respondents. Thus, one might expect that
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practices supported by incentive or cost share programs to be more likely adopted in tandem, such as
the use of buffer strips and controlled stream access.

Adoption Analysis
Random Utility Model
The Random Utility Model (McFadden 1974) provides a framework for analyzing a discrete
decision. The choice decision is whether a producer uses a particular pasture management practice.
Although producer preferences are unobserved, it can be assumed that producers make decisions
based on the choice that maximizes utility. The Random Utility Model will be used to analyze
producer use of pasture management practices.
A respondent can choose to use or not use a pasture management practice. The variables

representing pasture management practice use are binary, with 0 denoting non-use and 1 use. Let K
represent the ith consumer’s utility for using one of the pasture management practices and K be the

utility from not using a pasture management practice. The ith producer will use a pasture
management practice if
(1)

K N K

Because the dependent variables are binary, the ith producer’s use of a pasture management practices
( K  is

(2)

>
0 if 
0
O
y 
>
1 if y N 0

>
where the latent propensity to use a pasture management practice is y
. The Random Utility Model

can be extended to a probabilistic framework: Pr j  1  Pr u  ε

u  ε   Pr ε  ε

L after the typical normalization      (Greene 2011).  is a vector of parameters, and 
is a matrix of producer characteristics. The probability of using a pasture management practice is
Pr   1  !" (L, where !" is a cumulative distribution function of K (Cooper 1997).
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A probit model can be used to analyze the use of one pasture management practice, as
estimated with maximum likelihood
(3)

lnL  ∑ln Φ βα      1  y ln 1  Φ  ]

where the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution is Φ. Overall
significance of the model is contained in the Log Likelihood Ratio (LLR) test. The LLR test
compared the log likelihood from the model with all variables to an intercept-only model. The test

statistic is LLR=-2(;e ;8 – ;e ; ) where ;8 is the log likelihood of the intercept only model, whereas
parameters are equal to zero and ; is the log likelihood of the unrestricted model. This test statistic

is distributed as   variate with k degrees of freedom, where the number of explanatory variables

included in the model is k (Greene 2011).
Multivariate Probit Model

The ten pasture management practices were divided into three groups based on factor
analysis results. The three pasture management type equations can be estimated using individual
probit models. However, a multivariate probit model can provide more efficient coefficient estimates
if the error terms of the individual probit models are correlated (Giesbert, Steiner, and Bendig 2011).
A trivariate probit model is used to analyze the effects of producer and farm characteristics on the use
of pasture management practices among cattle producers (Cappellari and Jenkins 2003). Each pasture
management practice ( > ,

>
,

>
U)

response depends on a set of unknown parameters ( , , U , a

vector of farm and producer characteristics ( ,  , U , and the error terms ( ,  , U . The error

terms contain unobservable factors that explain the probability of choosing a pasture management

practice in one of the three groups (Giesbert, Steiner, and Bendig 2011). The three regressions ( > ,
>
,

>
U)

from equation 4 take the value of 1 if the respondent uses one or more pasture management

practice from either of the three categories and 0 otherwise. The three equations are coded as binary
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variables

where j=1, 2 or 3. Y is equal to 1 if a respondent uses one or more of the pasture

management practices from a particular group.
(4)

>


  L   ,



1

>


N 0

>
U

 U LU  U ,

U

1

>
U

N 0

>


  L   ,



1

>


N 0

In the trivariate probit, each of the  are derived from a normal distribution that has a mean

of 0, and a covariance matrix Ω (equation 5), where the leading diagonal of the matrix is 1. Predicted

joint probabilities are found using the estimated model coefficients, where ^, , ^,U , ^,U represent

the unobserved correlation between the stochastic component of each pasture management practice
(Capellari and Jenkins 2003; Giesbert, Steiner, and Bendig 2011).

5


0
? F ~Z<[ ?0F ,
U
0
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To test overall significance, the LLR test is used. As shown in Capellari and Jenkins (2003) the
joint estimation of the three equations in (4) is based the evaluation of the loglikelihood function
(6)

ln L= K K ln ΦU µ , Ω

Where i=1,…N, N is the sample of independent observations, K is a weight for each observation,

and Φ3 is the trivariate normal cumulative density function with arguments µ and Ω.
(7)

¢K  2

K

µ = ¢K  LK , ¢K  LK , ¢KU U LKU 

 1 , so ¢K equals 1 if a respondent uses a pasture management practice or -1

otherwise. The constituent elements of matrix Ω are shown in (8) (Giesbert, Steiner, and Bendig

2011).

8

¥ =1 for j= 1, 2, 3
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Using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) algorithm, the trivariate probit model
estimates normal, multi-dimensional functions (Greene 2003; Capellari and Jenkins 2003). Under
the above assumptions, the correlation coefficients summarize latent factors that determine the
likelihood that a respondent will choose a pasture management practice from one of the three
groups.

Hypothesized effects
Independent variables and their corresponding hypothesized effects on the use of pasture
management practices are listed in table 12 in appendix C. It is hypothesized that respondents who
manage more pasture acres (pastureacres) will be more likely to use pasture management practices.
Larger operators can reduce the average cost by spreading costs of the practices over more acres
(Feder et al. 1985). It is expected that a respondent’s household income (income) as well as the
percent of income from cattle production (cowpercent) will be positively associated with use of
pasture management practices. Higher income (income) usually indicates a greater flexibility in
adopting new technologies (Kim, Gillespie and Paudel 2005). In addition, a higher percent of income
from cattle production could reflect a prioritization of long-run economic efficiency with respect to
pasture and cattle production (Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel 2005). Stocking density (stockdensity) is
likely to be positively correlated with use of pasture management practices, especially in the
soilfertility group. If a respondent has a higher stocking rate, the respondent might have a greater
need for practices that increase soil productivity.
It is hypothesized that a respondent’s age (age) will be negatively associated with use of
pasture management practices, while education level, socol and college (highsch is base case) will be
positively associated with the use of pasture management practices. Prokopy et al. 2008 found that
older and less educated producers are not as likely to adopt BMPs. Wu and Babcock (1998) found
that education was positively associated with adoption rates, thus college and socol are expected to
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be positive relative to respondents who only attended high school. It is also interesting to note that
Prokopy et al (2008) found no studies in which educational attainment had a statistically significant
negative effect on adoption.
Rahelizatovo (2002) found that dairy producers who have contact with extension are more
likely to adopt BMPs. Extension is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent has
attended an extension workshop within the past year, and it is expected to be positively correlated
with use of pasture management practices.
It is expected that a respondent’s future plans will influence use of pasture management
practices. Producers, whose families will take over farming after their retirement (cease), are
expected to have higher adoption rates (Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel 2007). It is expected that
operation of the farm as a sole proprietorships (soleprop) will be positively associated with pasture
management practice use. It is believed that those respondents who operate independently are more
likely to adopt conservation measures than a corporate or jointly owned farm. However, Prokopy et
al (2008) found that this characteristic was positive and negative in an approximately equal number
of studies.
A dummy variable indicates whether a respondent had an off-farm job (offarmdummy). It is
expected that having an off-farm job will have a negative effect on pasture management practice
usage. In a study of CRP participation, Lambert, Sullivan, and Classen (2007) found this to be true.
Respondents who are full-time farmers are more likely to be interested in using practices that
increase production potential; alternatively, farmers who have off-farm sources of income might
consider their farming operation to be of somewhat lower priority.
Geographical differences are represented by ERS regions. A map of these regions is shown in
figure 1. There are eight regions (heartland, northerncrescent, northerngreatplains, easternuplands,
southernseaboard, fruitfulrim, mississippiportal, and prairiegateway). Several regions are combined
to account for relatively small number of respondents representing those regions:
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northerngreatplains with prairiegatway and mississippiportal with southernseaboard. These regional
variables control for differences in growing seasons, weather conditions, common types of farms,
and overall cost of production. It is difficult to provide hypothesis for the regional variables, because
the variety of dimensions in which the regions differ (Allen 1993).
Rainfall data is represented by total annual rainfall (mm), averaged over 30 years, for the
respondent’s county. The data was derived by using PRISM GIS data from Oregon State University
(PRISM 2013). The average annual amount of precipitation (precip) is expected to be positively
correlated with use, especially with practices related to the riparianhealth group. The likely effect on
the soilfertility group is unknown. On one hand, precip and npk might be negatively associated as
nitrogen leaching can occur with greater amounts of rainfall. However, fertilizer is more effective
when used with adequate rainfall, so a positive relationship is also feasible.
Woodland is a discrete variable indicating whether a respondent owns or rents woodland
acres, grazed and non-grazed. The effect of woodland acreage on pasture management practice use
has not been previously studied. It is hypothesized that woodland ownership (woodland) will have a
positive effect on use, assuming that the decision to own and retain woodlands is a conscious
decision, indicating a conservation ethic. It is hypothesized that respondents who have forested acres
oftentimes do so because they appreciate the private amenities forests bring, such as hunting
opportunities, wind protection, aesthetic value, and shade. Public benefits include carbon
sequestration and increased water quality. Thus, it is hypothesized that respondents who value these
benefits would also value similar environmental benefits from a productive pasture or healthy stream,
suggesting a possible positive relationship between woodland acres and usage of pasture
management practices.
Similarly, a proxy variable was developed to reflect a respondent’s state’s attitudes toward
environmental conservation. If resident of a state in which a respondent resides actively promotes
conservation behavior, it would be logical to assume that respondents would either reflect or be
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influenced by these activities. Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) is a
certification program which is given to buildings that meet a set of environmentally conscious
prerequisites (Newsham, Mancini, and Brit 2009). The process of obtaining LEED certification is
often tedious and expensive. It is hypothesized that people who live in states with a greater square
foot per capita of LEED certified buildings (LEED) will be more environmentally conscious, which
should result in a positive relationship between LEED and pasture management practice use. Based
on layered causality, if a respondent lives in a state that promotes conservation and “green” behavior,
it is hypothesized that he or she will be more likely to conserve, or for the purposes of this chapter,
use pasture management practices with demonstrable environmental benefits.
Finally, Prokopy et al. (2008) found that positive attitudes toward the environment generally
had a positive effect on adoption rates. Therefore, it is hypothesized that when a respondent feels
strongly about being a steward of the land (steward), he or she is more likely to use pasture
management practices.

Results
As stated above, the overall response rate for the two surveys was approximately 28%.
Overall, there were 338 respondents who did not use any of the ten pasture management practices,
and 4,073 respondents who used at least one of the practices. Individual use means of each practice
can be found in tables 10 and 11 in appendix C.

Mean comparisons
Univariate means test was used to test if there was significance difference in the means
between users and non-users in each group of pasture management practices: soilfertility,
riparianhealth, and other. The results are located in appendix C in tables 13, 14, and 15.
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Of the 22 variables included, only nine variables were found to have significantly difference
means between users and non-users in all three groups of practices. On average, users of all three
pasture management groups were younger (age), better educated (college), and have more household
income (income) than non-users. Users in all three groups were also more likely to attend extension
workshops (extension), and these respondents are more likely to have woodland (woodland). Those
respondents who worked off farm (offfarmwork) were more likely to use any of the pasture
management practices, and stocking density rates (stockdensity) were higher among users as well.
The only regional variable that was consistently significant throughout all pasture management
practice groups was the ERS region prairiegateway.
Pastureacres and socol were the only variables in which there were no significant differences
in means between users and non-users for any of the pasture management practice groups.

Spearman correlations
An analysis using Spearman correlations suggests that low-to-moderate correlations exist
between the use of pasture management practices. It is interesting to note that while the correlations
are relatively low, no correlation was found to be negative. Results of Spearman correlations are
found in table 16 in appendix C.
In the soilfertility group, soil testing, testsoil, had a moderate correlation (0.364) with npk.
Testsoil and npk also had a moderate correlation with replantpasture, 0.373 and 0.262, respectively.
In the riparianhealth group, Bufferstrips and streamaccess had the strongest relative relationship
with a correlation of 0.375, indicating that these two pasture management practices are used together
somewhat frequently. In addition, bufferstrips also had a moderately strong positive relationship with
shade (0.325) and crossings (0.311). Crossings had a moderate positive relationship with
streamaccess (0.343). Bufferstrips, crossings, shade, and streamaccess are conservation intensive
pasture management practices and all contribute to maintaining riparian and stream health. Thus it
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can be assumed that if a producer sees the benefit of adding buffer strips, he or she will also derive
benefit from controlling stream crossings and access. These correlations could also indicate the
presence of a stream. The practices included in the other group all have low correlations with one
another, indicating that these practices are not necessarily used together.
Multivarirate probit
The results of the trivariate probit model are provided in table 17 of appendix C. Three
dependent variables were included in the model: soilmanagement, riparianhealth, and other. Each
pasture management practice group was tested against the same set of variables. The model as a
whole is statistically significant (p<0.01), meaning that the unrestricted model fits better than a
model with no predictors. The correlations between error terms were found positive and significant in
each equation.
Soil fertility practices
Of the 19 variables included in the soilfertility equation, 12 were positive and significant at
the 10 percent level. Respondents who attended (socol) or graduated from college (college) were
more likely to use practices related to soil fertility than respondents who only attended or graduated
high school. Respondents with higher incomes (income) are more likely to use this group of
practices.
The more densely a producer stocks his cattle (stockdensity), the greater the chance of soil
fertility use. If a respondent has a higher stocking density, there could be a greater need for these
practices due to an overuse of resources. In addition, the greater the percent of income from cattle a
respondent has (cowpercent), the more likely he or she is to use soil fertility practices. In addition,
respondents who own woodland (ownwood) are more likely to use soil fertility practices.
If a respondent believed strongly in acting as a steward of the land (steward), he or she is
more likely to use the soilfertility pasture management practices. Also, the variable representing the
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amount of LEED certified buildings per state (LEED) was found to be a significant influence on the
use of soil fertility practices. If a respondent lives in a state with more LEED certified buildings per
person, he or she is more likely to use soil fertility practices. Respondents who attended at least one
extension workshop in the past year (extension) were found to be more likely to use this group of
practices.
Several regional and geographic variables were found significant. Respondents from the
heartland (heartland) and eastern uplands (easternuplands) are more likely to use soil fertility
practices than respondents from the prairiegateway region. The heartland region has the highest
value of production of any region, which could indicate that pastureland in this area is overused and
in need of soil fertility practices to maintain high levels of production. In addition, the amount of
precipitation (precip) was found to be positively related to soil fertility practices.
Riparian health practices
Six of the 19 variables included in riparianhealth equation were found to be significant.
Unlike with the soilfertility group, regional variables were not found to have an effect on practices
related to riparian health (riparianhealth). Age (age) has a negative effect and income (income) has
a positive effect on the use of riparian health practices. Attendance of extension workshops
(extension) has a significant positive relationship with these practices. Similarly to soilfertility,
extension workshops often provide services, education, and materials for producers to improve farm
health and production.
As in practices related to soil fertility, the amount of precipitation (precip) is positively
related to the use of riparian health practices. This could be because if a respondent lives in an area
with more precipitation, there is an increased likelihood that there would be a running stream on his
or her property. In addition, the more pasture acres a respondent manages (pastureacres), the greater
the likelihood the respondent uses a riparian health practice. If a respondent has woodland
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(woodland), he or she is more likely to use this set of practices. This relationship is logical, because
trees can act as buffer strips, offer shade, and control cattle’s access to streams.
Other practices
Of the 19 variables included in the other practices equation, which are alternativewater,
manure, and geotextiles, 12 were found to have a significant effect. Unlike with the other two groups,
precipitation (precip) has a negative effect on other pasture management practices. The change of
signs could be explained by the possible negative correlation between precipitation amounts and the
use of alternativewater. Those respondents who use an alternative water source might do so because
of the lack of precipitation. The amount of pasture acres (pastureacres) positively affects the use of
other practices. For example, if a respondent has more pasture, it might be more convenient to
recycle manure over many acres. In addition, more pasture acres might imply a greater need for
supplemental water sources. Woodland acres (woodland), percent of income from cattle
(cowpercent), and stocking density (stockdensity) also have a positive effect.
As in the riparianhealth equation, age (age) has a negative effect on use of other pasture
management practices. Respondents, who are older, might be getting ready for retirement and not
interested in investing time and money into using a new pasture management practice. Respondents
who attended at least one extension workshop (extension) were found to be more likely to use this
group of pasture management practices.
Compared with prairiegateway, all of the ERS regions (heartland, easternuplands,
southernseaboard, northercrescent, and fruitfulrim) were found to have a positive effect on the use
of other pasture management practices.
Between the three different groups of pasture management practices, only three variables
were significant throughout: extension, precip, and woodland. Extension and woodland were positive
in all three while precip was positive in both the soilfertility and riparianhealth equations but
negative in the other equation.
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Discussion
Pasture management practices can provide many benefits including increased soil and water
quality, higher land productivity, improved forage, and decreased bank erosion, among many others.
The usage of pasture management practices is not consistent among producers, as indicated by the
means listed in table 9 of appendix C. This inconsistency could be due to time constraints, costs, and
lack of familiarity of the practice.
Almost 4,000 producers were asked whether or not they used ten different pasture
management practices. The most commonly used practices were the use of shade structures away
from water and alternative water sources. The least common was the use of geotextiles. As shown by
the means testing, many producer characteristics differed between user and non-users. Using factor
analysis, the pasture management practices were sorted into three groups: soil fertility, riparian
health, and other practices. In most cases, the practices included in each management group had a
moderate correlation which one another, as shown by the spearman coefficients. Each group of
pasture management practices was found to be significantly affected by a different set of producer
and farm characteristics. The significance of the amount of LEED certified square feet per capita in
the soil fertility group of pasture management practices could indicate that producers are influenced
by local public attitudes. There were several variables that significantly influenced each equation in
the trivariate probit model: attendance of extension workshops, precipitation amount, and ownership
of woodland acres.
For future research, it would be interesting to explore how a running stream on a
respondent’s property affects the use of the pasture management practice groups. In addition,
analyzing how incentives affect use of pasture management practices could also provide insight into
who uses these practices and for what reasons.
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Appendix C
Table 10: Descriptions of Pasture Management Practices (n=3106)
Variable

Survey Description

Mea
n

Weighed
Acres (1000s)

Benefits

soilfertility
npk

Apply N,P, or K
fertilizer to pastures

0.51

88.90

Improve forage quality, increase
production, increase legume
species growth.

testsoil

Periodically test soil

0.49

85.19

Help decide how much fertilizer
needed to improve productivity

replantpasture

Replant bare pasture
with legumes or
native grasses

0.41

72.46

Increase production, maintain soil
quality, increase water quality

shade

Have shade
structures, scratching
posts, and feed
supplements placed
away from streams

0.60

102.11

Increased water quality, decrease
soil erosion and compaction,
preserve desired vegetation

crossings

Have improved
stream crossings

31.16

Promote uniform grazing, decrease
stream bank erosion, improve
water quality, decrease chances for
cattle injury

streamaccess

Control livestock
access to streams

0.20

34.43

Lessen sediment pollution,
decrease erosion, improve water
quality, and increase health of
stream vegetation

bufferstrip

Have buffer strips of
woody or grassy
vegetation along
waterways

0.34

58.99

Filter for pollutants, increase water
quality, and maintain water banks.

manure

Apply Manure as
fertilizer to pastures

0.41

67.79

alternative
water

Water cattle at site
other than stream or
pond

0.60

106.41

geotextiles

Protect heavy use
areas with geotextiles

0.08

13.78

riparianhealth

0.18

other
Manure can recycle nutrients,
improve soil quality, and protect
water quality.
Decrease stream or pond bank
erosion, improve water quality, and
maintain health and productivity of
farm.
Provides a stable and non-eroding
surface, decrease mud
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Table 11: Pasture Management Practice Groups and Mean Use in ERS regions
Pasture Management Practice Groups
ERS Region

soilfertility

riparianhealth

other

heartland

0.8201

0.7306

0.8161

prairiegateway

0.5744

0.6686

0.6765

southernseaboard

0.8059

0.7521

0.7516

northerngreatplains

0.2976

0.6905

0.7500

easternuplands

0.7959

0.7059

0.7273

fruitfulrim

0.6822

0.6355

0.8879
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Table 12: Variable List and Hypothesized Effects
Independent
Description
Hypothesized
Variables
Sign
pastureacres
number of total acres
farmed (100s)
age
respondent’s age
+
income
1 if respondent’s total
income is less than
$10,000; 2 if respondent’s
income is between $10,000
and $29,000; 3 if
respondent’s income is
between $30,000 and
$49,999; 4 if respondent’s
income is between $50,000
and $99,999; 5 if
respondent’s income is
between $100,000 and
$149,000; 6 if respondent’s
income is between
$150,000 and $199,000; 7
if respondent’s income is
between $200,000 and
$499,999; 8 if respondent’s
income is greater than
$500,000
cowpercent
Share or respondent’s
+
percent of income that
comes from cattle
extension
1 if respondent attended
+
any extension workshops in
2012; 0 otherwise
highsch
1 if respondent attended
only high school; 0
otherwise
socol
1 if respondent attended
some college but did not
graduate; 0 otherwise
college
1 if respondent graduated
from college; 0 otherwise
offfarmdummy
1 if respondent works off
farm; 0 only on farm
woodland
1 if respondent owns
+
woodland; 0 otherwise
soleprop
1 if farm operated as “sole
+
proprietorship;” 0
otherwise

Minimum

Maximum

1

65,720

15
1

95
8

-10

100

0

1

omitted
0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1
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Table 12: Variable List and Hypothesized Effects continued
Independent
Description
Hypothesized
Variables
Sign
+
steward
1 if strongly disagree; 2 if
somewhat disagree; 3 if no
opinion; 4 if somewhat
agree; 5 if strongly agree
+
cease
1 if respondent’s
children/grandchildren will
farm land after they he/she
ceases farming
Stocking Rate: (.92*cows+
J+R(¦9)HJG+ 
.08* calves+ 1.35*
bulls+ .6*backgrounder
calves+ .6*stocker
calves+.92*dairy cows+
.8*replacement heifers
+.8*miscellaneous cattle)/
total number of pasture
acres farmed
LEED
square foot per person by
+
state
precip
annual rainfall per year
+
(mm)
heartland
0,1 ERS region
n/a
northerncrescent
0,1 ERS region
n/a
prairiegateway
0,1 ERS region
(base case)
easternuplands
0,1 ERS region
n/a
southernseaboard
0,1 ERS region
n/a
fruitfulrim
0,1 ERS region
n/a
a Stocking calculation was created by Holt (2013)

Minimum

Maximum

0

1

0

1

0

27.83

0.28

2.29

454.86

1794.30

0
0
omitted
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
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Table 13: Means of Producer Characteristics and T-Tests of Difference in Means of
Users and Non-Users of Practices in the soilfertility Group
soilfertility Group
Significance
Operator
All Pasture
Level
Characteristic
Owners (3194) Users (2375)
Non-users
(819)
pastureacres
306.71
305.13
316.37
age
62.74
62.32
63.44
**
income (a)
3.97
4.03
3.79
***
cowpercent
34.57
36.64
31.62
***
extension
0.30
0.35
0.16
***
highsch
0.41
0.39
0.47
***
socol
0.23
0.23
0.22
college
0.36
0.38
0.30
***
offfarmdummy
0.49
0.51
0.45
**
stockdensity
0.57
0.63
0.46
***
woodland
0.58
0.63
0.45
***
soleprop
0.79
0.78
0.82
**
steward (b)
4.58
4.62
4.49
***
cease
0.62
0.63
0.60
LEEDcert
0.95
0.96
0.93
precip
1080.50
1111.94
995.27
***
heartland
0.21
0.23
0.14
***
northerngreatplains
0.03
0.01
0.07
***
easternuplands
0.31
0.32
0.24
***
prairiegateway
0.21
0.16
0.35
***
southernseaboard
0.19
0.20
0.14
***
fruitfulrim
0.03
0.03
0.04
Notes: means are shown in the parentheses
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
a: Likert scale of income: 1 = less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000 - $29,000, 3 = $30,000 –
$49,000, 4 = $50,000 - $99,000, 5 = $100,000 - $149,999, 6 = $150,000 - $199,999, 7 =
$2,000 - $499,999, 8 = $500,000 or more
b: Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = no opinion, 4 =
somewhat agree, 5 = strongly agree
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Table 14: Means of Producer Characteristics and T-Tests of Difference in Means of
Users and Non-Users of Practices in the riparianhealth Group
riparianhealth Group
Significance
Operator
All Pasture
Level
Characteristic
Owners (3201)
Users (2277)
Non-users
(924)
pastureacres
306.71
271.43
395.94
age
62.74
62.18
63.75
***
income (a)
3.97
4.04
3.79
***
cowpercent
34.57
35.69
34.48
extension
0.30
0.34
0.22
***
highsch
0.41
0.39
0.47
***
socol
0.23
0.23
0.23
college
0.36
0.37
0.33
***
offfarmdummy
0.49
0.51
0.47
***
stockdensity
0.57
0.62
0.52
***
woodland
0.58
0.62
0.49
***
soleprop
0.79
0.78
0.81
steward (b)
4.58
4.61
4.54
*
cease
0.62
0.63
0.61
**
LEEDcert
0.95
0.96
0.92
**
precip
1080.50
1089.67
1064.38
***
heartland
0.21
0.21
0.19
northerngreatplains
0.03
0.02
0.03
easternuplands
0.31
0.30
0.31
prairiegateway
0.21
0.17
0.22
***
southernseaboard
0.19
0.14
0.10
***
fruitfulrim
0.03
0.03
0.04
Notes: means are shown in the parentheses
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
a: Likert scale of income: 1 = less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000 - $29,000, 3 = $30,000 –
$49,000, 4 = $50,000 - $99,000, 5 = $100,000 - $149,999, 6 = $150,000 - $199,999, 7 =
$2,000 - $499,999, 8 = $500,000 or more
b: Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = no opinion, 4 =
somewhat agree, 5 = strongly agree
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Table 15: Means of Producer Characteristics and T-Tests of Difference in Means of Users
and Non-Users of Practices in the other Group
other Group
Operator
Characteristic

All Pasture
Owners (3201)

Users (2411)

Non-users (790)

Significance
Level

pastureacres
306.71
275.84
402.32
age
62.74
62.21
63.94
***
oncome (a)
3.97
4.02
3.80
***
cowpercent
34.57
36.19
32.69
**
extension
0.30
0.34
0.22
***
highsch
0.41
0.40
0.45
***
socol
0.23
0.23
0.23
college
0.36
0.38
0.32
***
offfarmdummy
0.49
0.46
0.51
***
stockdensity
0.57
0.63
0.44
***
woodland
0.58
0.59
0.54
***
soleprop
0.79
0.79
0.79
steward (b)
4.58
4.59
4.57
cease
0.62
0.62
0.62
LEEDcert
0.95
0.96
0.92
**
precip
1080.50
1078.80
1092.52
heartland
0.21
0.22
0.15
***
northerngreatplains
0.03
0.03
0.03
easternuplands
0.31
0.29
0.33
***
prairiegateway
0.21
0.19
0.27
***
southernseaboard
0.19
0.18
0.19
fruitfulrim
0.03
0.04
0.02
***
Notes: means are shown in the parentheses
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
a: Likert scale of income: 1 = less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000 - $29,000, 3 = $30,000 – $49,000,
4 = $50,000 - $99,000, 5 = $100,000 - $149,999, 6 = $150,000 - $199,999, 7 = $2,000 $499,999, 8 = $500,000 or more
b: Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = no opinion, 4 = somewhat
agree, 5 = strongly agree
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Table 16: Spearman Correlations of Pasture Management Practices
Alternat- buffer
crossmanure npk
evewater -strips shade ings

streamaccess

geotexiles

Replantpasture

manure

1.000

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

npk
alternativeewater

0.028

1.000

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

0.131

0.128

1.000

--

--

--

--

--

--

bufferstrips

0.152

0.145

0.186

1.000

--

--

--

--

--

shade

0.105

0.143

0.208

0.325

1.000

--

--

--

--

crossings
streamaccess

0.114

0.089

0.127

0.311

0.212

1.000

--

--

--

0.140

0.115

0.196

0.375

0.232

0.343

1.000

--

--

geotextiles
Replantpasture

0.130

0.120

0.171

0.216

0.136

0.205

0.274

1.000

--

0.201

0.262

0.168

0.256

0.264

0.212

0.240

0.226

1.000

testsoil

0.184

0.364

0.166

0.265

0.213

0.178

0.235

0.230

0.373
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Table 17: Trivariate Probit Results and Estimated Coefficients
Pasture Management Practice Groups (n=3190)
Independent Variables
soilfertility
riparianhealth
otherpractices
precip
0.0015
0.0003
-0.0005
(0.0002)***
(0.0002)*
(0.0002)***
LEEDcert
0.1517
0.0881
-0.0237
(0.0602)**
(0.0554)
(0.0574)
pastureacres (x100)
0.0032
0.0033
0.0020
(0.0026)
(0.0002)**
(0.0030)*
age
-0.0036
-0.0045
-0.0039
(0.0023)
(0.0021)**
(0.0022)*
stockdensity
0.1108
0.0454
0.1184
(0.0479)**
(0.0342)
(0.0594)**
income
0.0470
0.0612
0.0270
(0.0196)**
(0.01771)***
(0.0190)
cowpercent
0.0025
0.0008
0.0020
(0.0008)***
(0.0007)
(0.0008)***
extension
0.6108
0.3129
0.3020
(0.0632)***
(0.0563)***
(0.0590)***
college
0.1546
0.0101
0.0829
(0.0637)**
(0.0599)
(0.0613)
socol
0.1146
0.0195
0.0003
(0.0687)*
(0.0643)
(0.0668)
cease
0.0686
0.0260
-0.0018
(0.0540)
(0.0507)
(0.0522)
steward
0.0915
0.0400
-0.0149
(0.0307)***
(0.0281)
(0.294)
soleprop
-0.0790
-0.0489
0.0494
(0.0657)
(0.0622)
(0.0632)
woodland
0.2281
0.2753
0.0986
(0.0564)***
(0.0528)***
(0.0551)*
northerncrescent
-0.0461
0.0236
0.6361
(0.1251)
(0.1241)
(0.1369)***
heartland
0.5474
0.0271
0.4373
(0.0865)***
(0.0811)
(0.0887)***
easternuplands
0.1613
-0.0765
0.2792
(0.0927)*
(0.0893)
(0.0927)***
southernseaboard
0.0483
0.0478
0.4064
(0.1093)
(0.1054)
(0.1108)***
fruitfulrim
-0.1899
-0.2017
0.9179
(0.1591)
(0.1474)
(0.1910)***
_cons
-2.0853
-0.2366
0.7849
(0.2922)
(0.2627)
(0.2818)***
0.3710***
^
0.2702***
LLR Test -267571.28***
^U
0.3306***
^U
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses; significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***)
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Figure 6: ERS Regions
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Conclusion
As the literature shows, cattle producer decision making process is oftentimes different
from their other crop and animal producers. This paper explored two different aspects of cattle
producers: the adoption of afforestation in a hypothetical program and the use of pasture
management practices. Chapter 1 found that producers who are interested in afforestation are
more likely to have a college degree, own woodland, attend extension workshops, and have
previous afforestation experience. It was also concluded that producers who are offered a lower
incentive enrolled more acres in the afforestation program while those who were offered a higher
incentive enrolled less acres. Chapter 2 looked at the use of ten pasture management practices.
These ten practices were then divided into three subgroups based on the type of practice: riparian
health, soil fertility management, and other types of practices. Ownership of woodland, extension
workshop attendance, and precipitation were found to be significant in all three equations.
As shown by the results, extension workshops have a positive effect on the conservation
behavior of cattle producers. Therefore, if policymakers want to increase producer participation,
it is recommended that education through extension efforts be highly prioritized.
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